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Retributivism, Agency, and the
Voluntary Act Requirement
Christopher P. Taggart*
Abstract
The Voluntary Act Requirement (“VAR”) is the fundamental
predicate for imposing legal punishment. Punishing solely on the
basis of evil thoughts or a villainous character is impermissible.
The VAR also embodies the notion that we must not punish
someone for conduct over which she lacked sufficient control. But
why not punish someone for conduct that was not within her
control? One answer is retributivist—it would be unjust to do so
because that defendant could not have been morally responsible
for, and therefore could not deserve punishment for, what she did.
Agent causalism is a contentious view about how criminal
defendants voluntarily act according to which the defendants
themselves cause their free, morally responsible actions, as
opposed to events or states of affairs involving them, their brains,
their circumstances, and so forth. This article argues that for
retributivist justifications of the VAR to be plausible, agent
causalism must be true. Agent causalism might be false, and if
it is, then retributivism could not play any role in justifying our
fundamental legal precondition for ever imposing any criminal
liability upon anyone. This article does not argue that agent
causalism is false, however. It elaborates and renders plausible
an agent causalist position, and it shows how that position could
handle types of cases that notoriously pose challenges to the
VAR—cases involving complex unconscious conduct, cases
involving crimes of omission, and cases involving habitual
conduct.
I.

Introduction

Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School. I wish to thank Palma Paciocco and
Mike Materni for very helpful comments on earlier drafts.
*
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Our criminal legal system requires that someone act
voluntarily before legal punishment is imposed upon her. This
idea is fundamental to the state ever being justified in punishing
anyone, and it is enshrined in our law in the form of the
Voluntary Act Requirement (“VAR”). Indeed, the American Law
Institute (“ALI”) deems the VAR “the fundamental predicate for
all criminal liability . . . .”1 According to the VAR, “the guilt of
the defendant [must] be based upon conduct, and that conduct
must include a voluntary act or an omission to perform an act of
which the defendant [is] physically capable.”2
Because the VAR is the fundamental precondition of any
criminal liability, justifying the VAR is an important element of
justifying our system of criminal law and our institution of
criminal punishment. At stake is justifying not just coercive,
painful government intrusion into the lives of criminals.
Punishment hurts criminals on purpose. Ideally, we should have
a good reason justifying every aspect of doing that. If criminal
law’s inclusion of the VAR is not defensible, then any attempt
systematically to justify imposing punishment on anyone under
our system would be woefully incomplete.
Utilitarian3 and retributive theories of punishment are the
two main avenues by which such explanations and justifications
proceed.4
This article elaborates a relationship between
1. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 explanatory note on subsection (1) (AM. LAW
INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
2. Id. Put differently:
A conviction of a defendant for crime C is justified only if (1)
There is a voluntary act, the performance of which is
necessary for C’s occurrence (given the statutory definition of
C) and (2) the defendant has been shown (typically, beyond a
reasonable doubt) to have performed such a voluntary act.
Gideon Yaffe, The Voluntary Act Requirement, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION
TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 174, 174 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012).
3. I use utilitarian broadly to include any consequentialist, welfarist
approach to normative analysis. Included are welfarist views according to
which the analyst does not simply sum up the values of individual utilities to
determine the value of a situation featuring those individuals.
4. See C. L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT 3 (Oxford Univ. Press
1987) (“The philosophical debate on punishment has been dominated by two
main types of theories of punishment, the utilitarian theory and the retributive
theory.”).
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retributivism and the VAR. There is a contentious5 view about
how criminal defendants, and human beings generally,
voluntarily act, called agent causalism.
Roughly, agent
causalism is the view that when we voluntarily act and are
morally responsible for what we do, we are the causes of our
conduct, as opposed to events or states of affairs, internal or
external to us, that deterministically cause our conduct. For
example, if Fred assaults someone voluntarily and is morally
responsible for doing so, then Fred causes his conduct—not
states of or events in Fred’s brain, but Fred himself. As will be
elaborated, agent causalism has emerged from attempts to solve
what has been called the problem of free will.
This article’s main thesis is that for retributivist
justifications of the VAR to be plausible, agent causalism must
be true. This thesis has a significant implication. Because agent
causalism is contentious, it might be false.6 And if agent
causalism is false, then, according to this article’s thesis, it
would be implausible that retributivism could play any role in
substantiating the fundamental legal precondition of ever
imposing any criminal liability upon anyone.
This article’s point of departure is the VAR as it is codified
at § 2.01 of the Model Penal Code (“MPC”). Therefore, it is
important to address one of the ALI’s official comments on MPC
§ 2.01 up front:
The term “voluntary” as used in [§ 2.01] does not
inject into the criminal law questions about
determinism and free will. Rather, it focuses upon
conduct that is within the control of the actor.
There is sufficient difference between ordinary
human activity and a reflex or a convulsion to
make it desirable that they be distinguished for
purposes of criminal responsibility by a term like

5. By contentious, I do not mean merely likely to cause controversy. By a
contentious view, I also mean that reasonable, informed people disagree about
the view. For a view to be contentious, it must be at least coherent and
somewhat plausible.
6. Although I am inclined to think that agent causalism is true, this paper
will try to establish only that it is coherent and plausible.

3

648

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36:3

“voluntary.”7
This comment seems to rule out the idea that a normative
theory’s ability to justify the VAR could turn on the relationship
between that theory, retributivism, and a view that is motivated
by responding to questions about determinism and free will,
agent causalism. The comment also clarifies that the rationale
behind the VAR focuses on whether an actor has control over her
conduct. Why does it matter whether the defendant was in
control of what she did when we decide whether she is criminally
responsible? Why not punish someone for conduct that was not
within her control? Perhaps the most natural, but by no means
the only, answer to this last question is that it would be unjust
to do so because that defendant could not have been morally
responsible for what she did.8
Some of the questions that arise in debates about how to
solve the problem of free will concern whether an actor can ever
be morally responsible for her conduct given the degree or type
of control over her conduct that she has or lacks. Many care
about the problem of free will because: (a) they want to have
enough of the right kind of control over what they do to be
morally responsible for what they do, at least sometimes, but (b)

7. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1985).
8. This answer is natural in part because a paradigmatic instance of
criminal punishment “must be of an actual or supposed offender for his
offense.” H. L. A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 5 (Oxford
Univ. Press 1967). Along similar lines:
I bring myself within the reach of the criminal law only when
I act: only when thought and intention are given active
embodiment in conduct which engages with the world, and
which may thus impinge on the rights and interests that the
criminal law aims to protect. It also . . . seems appropriate
because we can surely be held culpably responsible only for
what is within our control; and, once we move beyond the
realm of (mere) thought, it is our actions that we
paradigmatically control.
R. A. Duff, Acting, Trying, and Criminal Liability, in ACTION AND VALUE IN
CRIMINAL LAW 75, 78 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Duff,
Acting, Trying and Criminal Liability].
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causal determinism9 seems to threaten that sort of control. If
they lack the requisite control, then they lack moral
responsibility.
The ALI’s comment to MPC § 2.01 suggests that: (i) issues
surrounding the problem of free will have no bearing on the
VAR, but (ii) issues surrounding an actor’s control are of central
importance to the VAR. Therefore, it would seem that whatever
sense of a defendant’s control over her conduct the ALI has in
mind must not be connected with whether that defendant is ever
morally responsible for what she does.10 If what the ALI had in
mind by an actor’s control had anything to do with her moral
responsibility, then, the ALI’s protestations notwithstanding,
the ALI would be injecting into criminal law questions about
determinism and free will.
Some questions about determinism and free will, the ones
that animate the problem of free will, automatically get injected
into any discussion that turns on whether an agent has the
control requisite for moral responsibility. This injection follows
from: (1) what the problem of free will is about and one central
reason why it is significant, that is, the connection between
moral responsibility and control, and (2) the fact that some
questions about determinism and free will arise in connection
with that problem. If control and moral responsibility are
connected as they seem to be in many discussions of
determinism and free will, then the ALI is injecting questions
about determinism and free will into criminal law even though
it claims not to be.
Assume, however, that the ALI is not injecting questions
about determinism and free will into criminal law. More
specifically, assume that: (a) the ALI’s rationale behind the VAR
9. Causal determinism is the view that “the past and the laws of nature
together determine, at every moment, a unique future. . . .” Peter van Inwagen,
How to Think about the Problem of Free Will, 12 J. ETHICS 327, 330 (2008)
[hereinafter van Inwagen, How to Think].
10. I wish to thank Palma Paciocco and Mike Materni for pointing out that
the ALI might be assuming that questions about determinism and free will are
not injected into the criminal law by the VAR because the problem of free will
has a solution, according to which we are often free and morally responsible
for what we do. In other words, the ALI might be taking it for granted that a
defendant must be morally responsible for what she does if she is to be
punished for her conduct and that in most cases in which she has control over
her conduct she is morally responsible for what she does.
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turns on an agent’s control over her conduct but (b) an agent’s
control over her conduct has nothing to do with her moral
responsibility for her conduct. That is, assume that an agent’s
moral responsibility for her conduct has nothing to do with the
ALI’s rationale behind the fundamental predicate for criminal
liability.11 Perhaps the important thing for the ALI is that
sufficiently-controlled conduct is required to justify imposing
legal punishment, as opposed to: (i) some kind of non-conduct,
such as a status12 or mere thought,13 over which the defendant
has less control or (ii) behavior such as a tic or seemingly goaloriented yet unconscious behavior,14 over which the defendant
11. To emphasize, this is just a working assumption. It is not my goal to
offer the best interpretation of what the ALI’s view is.
12. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). In Robinson, the
Court held that “a state law which imprisons a person [addicted to narcotics]
as a criminal, even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the
State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 667.
In reaching this holding, the Court stressed that the statute at issue made “the
‘status’ of narcotic addiction a criminal offense, for which the offender may be
prosecuted ‘at any time before he reforms.’” Id. at 666.
13. There are rationales for not criminalizing thoughts that do not
emphasize the agent’s degree of control over her own thoughts. For example,
even if the agent had the same type and degree of control over her thoughts
that she had over her voluntary actions, it would be impermissible to
criminalize thoughts because of her right to freedom of thought. “There is
something objectionable about criminalizing thoughts alone. Prohibitions on
thoughts are intrusive violations of privacy, efforts at mind control, and
inconsistent with the goals and role of a liberal state.” Yaffe, supra note 2, at
175.
14. In People v. Newton, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394 (Ct. App. 1970), the defendant
appealed his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, arguing that during the
time that he shot his victim, he was not conscious because he himself was in
an altered state caused by having been shot in the abdomen. The conviction
was reversed. Id. at 415. An expert witness testified that the defendant could
have been in a “reflex shock condition” in which the defendant unconsciously
engaged in complex goal-oriented behavior usually indicative of conscious
action. Id. at 403. Central to the reversal was that:
The difference between . . . diminished capacity and
unconsciousness . . . is one of degree only: where the former
provides a “partial defense” by negating a specific mental
state essential to a particular crime, the latter is a “complete
defense” because it negates capacity to commit any crime at
all.
Id. at 405-06.
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has less control. The defendant’s moral responsibility for her
status, thoughts, behavior, or controlled conduct is entirely
beside the point.
Even if the ALI thought that moral
responsibility was irrelevant to the fundamental predicate of
criminal liability, we could, and should, ask whether such a
position is defensible. Even though its views are worthy of
serious consideration, the ALI, of course, is not a primary legal
or moral authority.
Of the two main competing theories—utilitarianism and
retributivism—the idea that moral responsibility is irrelevant to
the VAR is more at home with utilitarianism. Utilitarian
theories do not center on the evaluation of actors as retributive
theories do.15 Whether an actor is morally responsible for her
conduct is central to how retributive justificatory reasons work,
if they work at all. But for the utilitarian, if: (i) an actor is not
morally responsible for her conduct but (ii) nonetheless her
conduct can be influenced by influencing her, then the VAR
might be substantiated by appealing to, say, punishment’s
deterrent effects. The basic utilitarian idea would be that for a
criminal defendant, or anyone, to be deterred from acting a
certain way, she must be in sufficient control of her conduct,
even if she bears no moral responsibility for her conduct.16
15. See infra Part II for an elaboration on the focus of utilitarian theories
on evaluating actions on the basis of their consequences instead of focusing on
evaluating actors.
16. Of course, this sort of utilitarian approach has its own challenges to
overcome. For example, a utilitarian might try to justify the VAR by arguing
that:
Those who only wish and fantasize criminal acts, but don’t
actually do them, aren’t dangerous; those whose
(involuntary) clumsiness cause[s] others harm aren’t
deterrable; etc.
Yet it is not obvious that these
generalizations hold. Mightn’t ‘accident-prone’ individuals
be dangerous, and thus subject to preventative detention on
utilitarian grounds? Mightn’t such classes of individuals be
somewhat deterrable, a least to the extent that they could
take some precautions against their dangerous tendencies?
And even if they themselves are not deterrable, mightn’t the
criminal law gain an increment of general deterrence by
making such persons liable anyway, because then those
voluntarily causing harm will know that there is no
possibility of pretending to have involuntarily caused it?
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The retributivist does not rely on this idea. Instead, the
basic retributivist idea is that someone should be punished
because she deserves it. Does the criminal defendant’s desert
warrant punishment, and if so, how much? Any retributivist
attempt to justify the VAR must address how the VAR helps
insulate those who are not morally responsible for their conduct,
and therefore lack desert, from criminal liability.17
Consider the following: (i) a necessary condition for an
actor’s desert is that she conduct herself in some way and be
morally responsible for that conduct; (ii) a necessary condition
for an actor to be morally responsible for her conduct is that she
have the right sort of control over her conduct; (iii) a necessary
condition for an actor to have the right sort of control over her
conduct is that agent causalism be true; therefore, (iv) a
necessary condition for an actor’s desert is that agent causalism
be true. Since a criminal defendant’s desert is the central idea
of retributivist justifications, including any such justification of
the VAR, for retributivist justifications of the VAR to be
plausible, agent causalism must be true. That is the kernel of
this article’s argument for its main thesis.
After presenting the argument for the main thesis, I shall
spend considerable space examining whether agent causalism is
coherent and plausible.
As previously explained, the
significance of the main thesis turns in part on whether agent
causalism is contentious, and to be contentious agent causalism
must be coherent and at least somewhat plausible. I shall also
apply an agent-causal retributivist approach to justifying the
VAR to three categories of non-paradigmatic cases. The goal will
MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS
IMPLICATION FOR CRIMINAL LAW 47 1993) [hereinafter MOORE, ACT AND CRIME].
17. I am not suggesting that according to retributivist theories the VAR
must shoulder the entire burden of shielding those not morally responsible
from criminal liability. For example, a retributivist might think that much of
that burden is borne by the MPC’s culpability requirements or by Article 4.
For example, Model Penal Code § 4.01(1) absolves an actor of criminal liability
for his conduct if “at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality . . . of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.” Also, note
that according to standard retributivist theories, desert is not merely
necessary for punishment. It is also sufficient. In connection with justifying
the VAR, however, the part of retributivism that is particularly relevant is the
view that desert is necessary for punishment.
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be to bolster the credibility of agent-causal retributivism by
showing how it yields defensible results even in hard cases.
More specifically, the remainder of this paper proceeds as
follows:
In Part II, I explain that a defensible retributivist theory
requires that for someone to deserve legal punishment, she must
conduct herself in some way and be morally responsible for that
conduct. I do this by distinguishing utilitarian theories from
retributivist theories and then elaborating the key retributivist
notion of desert in light of those distinctions. In Part III, I
examine what sort of control over her own conduct would be
necessary for someone to be morally responsible for her conduct,
and therefore to deserve legal punishment for it. I do this by
discussing two related problems concerning moral responsibility
and control over what one does—the problem of moral luck and
the problem of free will. In Part IV, I present agent causalism
as a view that affords actors the sort of control necessary for
moral responsibility. To substantiate my claim that agent
causalism is contentious, I argue that agent causalism is
coherent and at least somewhat plausible, even though I do not
attempt a thorough defense of agent causalism. In Part V, I
continue to argue that agent causalism is plausible. Drawing
heavily on the work of others, I sketch a picture of how agents
fit into voluntary actions resulting from practical deliberation to
explain how, according to agent causalism, the way that agents
voluntarily act might be responsive to practical reasons. In Part
VI, I bolster the contention that agent causalism is plausible by
showing how it might aid the retributivist in regard to three
sorts of cases in which the VAR is implicated—cases involving
complex unconscious conduct, cases involving crimes of
omission, and cases involving habitual conduct. I conclude with
some brief summarizing remarks.
II. Desert Requires Moral Responsibility for Voluntary Action
As mentioned above, there are two dominant types of
justifications of legal punishment—utilitarian and retributivist.
A normatively important question regarding punishment is:
“what justifies the state in inflicting hard treatment on people
for their supposed or claimed wrongdoing with the intention that
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that treatment cause the supposed or claimed wrongdoer to
suffer?”18
When the state punishes, it purposely inflicts
suffering upon the defendant. In a case where a defendant is
found not guilty of murder by reason of insanity, he may be
confined to an institution to protect the public. And his
confinement might cause him to suffer. But the point of
confining him is not to inflict suffering upon him.19 Because
legal punishment, in contrast, purposely, not just knowingly,
inflicts suffering, the call for its justification is especially
exigent.
A.

Utilitarian Theories of Punishment

Utilitarian20 theories of punishment center on the effects of
punitive practices and decisions on the well-being of individuals
in society—criminal defendants included.21
They are
18. Mitchell N. Berman, The Justification of Punishment, in THE
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 141, 143 (Andrei Marmor
ed., 2012).
19. See DAVID BOONIN, THE PROBLEM OF PUNISHMENT 13 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2008) (“In [confining him], the state recognizes that its action will
seriously harm the [defendant], but harming him is not its intention. Its
intention is merely to protect the public, and it would lock him up even if this
did not harm him.”).
20. Technically, utilitarianism is committed to specific ways of
amalgamating utilities when assessing the value of a state of affairs. The
utilitarian either takes the sum of individual utilities (classical utilitarianism)
or the average of individual utilities (average utilitarianism) in computing a
numerical representation of the value of a situation—that situation’s amount
of social welfare. I intend my claims about a utilitarian approach to justifying
punishment to carry over to any welfarist approach that is committed to
consequentialism. Welfarism is the view that the only features of a state of
affairs that determine the state’s intrinsic value are, collectively, the state’s
utility information (i.e., a pairing of each individual in a situation with her
utility in that situation).
21. The central utilitarian idea has been expressed in a number of ways.
See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CRIMINAL LAW 14 (5th ed. 2009) (“according to classical
utilitarianism . . . the purpose of all laws is to maximize the net happiness of
society. Laws should be used to exclude, as far as possible, all painful and
unpleasant events . . . . [B]oth crime and punishment are unpleasant . . . . [T]he
pain inflicted by punishment is justifiable if, but only if, it is expected to result
in a reduction in the pain of crime that would otherwise occur.”); TEN, supra
note 4, at 3 (“The utilitarian theory justifies punishment solely in terms of its
beneficial effects or consequences . . . . [U]ltimately the only morally significant
features of an act are the good and bad consequences produced by it. A right
act is that which, among the available alternatives, produces the best
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consequentialist theories. According to consequentialism, only
the consequences of implementing feasible options are relevant
to what choices morally ought to be made.22 “[C]onsequentialism
is the doctrine that the moral value of any action always lies in
its consequences, and that it is by reference to their
consequences that actions . . . are to be justified if they are to be
justified at all.”23 A consequentialist does not merely aver that
consequences are of primary moral importance. She claims that
only consequences are morally relevant to choice. Thus, a nonconsequentialist might consistently think that the consequences
of feasible alternatives are always very important moral
considerations. As John Rawls emphasizes, it is a mistake to
think that non-consequentialist theories “characterize the
rightness of institutions and acts independently from their
consequences. All ethical doctrines worth our attention take
consequences.”); LLOYD L.WEINREB, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENT,
QUESTIONS 327 (7th ed. 2003) (“punishment is justified by its utility, the good
that it does, not necessarily for the criminal himself but for the community.”).
22. It is possible for a theorist to be a consequentialist when it comes to
justifying punishment without being a consequentialist tout court:
Because it is customary to classify moral theories . . . as either
consequentialist or deontological, it is tempting to suppose
that consequentialist theories of punishment must be
committed to a consequentialist ethic . . . . However, the
mapping of consequentialist theories of punishment onto
consequentialist moral theories is too facile . . . .
Consequentialism in punishment theory is a view regarding
how the intentional infliction of suffering for wrongdoing can
be morally justified; it is not a view about value or right
action more generally.
Berman, supra note 18, at 144.
Of course, anyone who is a consequentialist vis-à-vis punishment but who
denies consequentialism with respect to the evaluation of other important
social choices presumably has reasons for the discontinuous nature of her
approach. And it would be fair to ask such a theorist what those reasons are.
For example, why be a consequentialist when it comes to justifying legal
punishment but not be a consequentialist when it comes to, say, justifying one
particular redistributive tax-and-transfer regime over others? Putting this
aside, since I am discussing only theories of legal punishment, I shall assume
that the possibility of a fair weather consequentialist does not impugn the
details of my characterization of a utilitarian theory of punishment as a type
of consequentialist theory of punishment.
23. Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM:
FOR AND AGAINST 75, 79 (J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams ed., 1973).
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consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did
not would simply be irrational, crazy.”24
Of particular significance for this paper, “a central idea of
consequentialism [and therefore of utilitarianism] is that the
only kind of thing that has intrinsic value is a state of affairs,
and that anything else that has value has it because it conduces
to some intrinsically valuable state of affairs.”25
For a
consequentialist, consequences are all that ever ultimately
matter morally, and consequences are states of affairs.26 The
deontic status27 of a social, or individual, choice depends on the
comparative intrinsic values of the states of affairs that would
be brought about by the options that are feasible for society, or
the individual, at the time of choice. For this reason, the
criminal defendant is not the central object of normative
assessment for utilitarian justifications of punishment. The
utilitarian takes an ex ante point of view—the social choices (a)
to adopt a particular system of criminal punishment and (b) to
impose, under that system, a certain amount of legal
punishment upon a particular defendant are to be justified by
the consequences of doing so. If the consequences of such choices
are better than those of any feasible alternatives, then we should
make those particular choices—our legally punishing in that
way is justified.
An obvious potentially beneficial effect of legal punishment
is crime reduction. Accordingly, it is common for utilitarian
analysts to focus on various ways that punishment reduces
crime when they offer justifications for legal punishment.
24. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 30 (Harvard Univ. Press 1971).
This is not to deny that a non-consequentialist of an extreme sort might think
that the consequences of feasible options are always irrelevant to moral choice.
Such a view is one possible type of non-consequentialist view. (In my opinion,
such an extreme form of non-consequentialism is very implausible.) But to
reiterate the main point, it is a misunderstanding to think that nonconsequentialists characteristically do not consider consequences to be
important, morally relevant factors when making social choices.
25. Williams, supra note 23, at 83.
26. Informally, one might say that a consequence is a type of situation—
a situation that results from or is the outcome of an action or choice—such as
the choice to imprison Fred for five years or the choice not to impose criminal
liability upon Linda or the choice to abolish all strict liability crimes.
27. For example, morally permissible, morally forbidden, and morally
required.
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Publically punishing Fred for committing a crime is justified
because it reduces crime by scaring people into not committing
it (general deterrence); punishing Fred for committing a crime is
justified because the horrible experience of being punished will
scare Fred into not committing future crimes (specific
deterrence); punishing Fred for committing a crime is justified
because punishing him improves his character so that he will
not commit future crimes (rehabilitation); punishing Fred for
committing a crime by incarcerating him is justified because
incarcerating him prevents him from committing future crimes,
at least for as long as he remains incarcerated.28
Notice that the thing that the utilitarian promotes in the
previous paragraph is always a situation with less crime going
on in it. Of course, utilitarians care, often a lot, about certain
features of agents—for example, whether Fred is dangerous,
how well-off Fred or anyone else would be under various
circumstances, and so forth. And a utilitarian might even think,
in some derivative sense, that such features have moral or
ethical29 significance. But the only type of thing that has any
intrinsic moral/ethical value for a utilitarian is a situation. For
the utilitarian, there are primarily two types of things that get
morally/ethically assessed—choices, actions, and outcomes. The
assessment of a choice, as permissible, impermissible, etc.,
depends on a prior assessment of the intrinsic moral/ethical
value of its outcome. And for a utilitarian, the moral/ethical
value of an outcome is a function solely of the utilities of the
individuals, including the criminal offenders, in30 that outcome.
28. Of course, crime reduction need not be the only potentially welfareenhancing consequence that a utilitarian theorist of legal punishment focuses
on. For example, if we assume a preference-satisfaction interpretation of
individual utility, then, if enough persons have a stable preference that
offenders receive what might be considered their just deserts, then legally
punishing in a certain way might significantly increase individual utilities,
and therefore increase social welfare. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, The Fairness of Sanctions: Some Implications for Optimal
Enforcement Policy, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 223 (2000).
29. Some may try to distinguish the concepts expressed by terms such as
moral, morality, and morally from the concepts expressed by terms such as
ethical, ethics, and ethically. This article does not draw such distinctions.
30. To say that Fred is in a state of affairs (or situation, or outcome) is to
say that if that state of affairs were actual, then Fred would exist. And Fred’s
utility in an outcome refers to how well-off Fred would be if that outcome were
to come to pass. This article will not consider how defensible a standard
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Retributivist Theories of Punishment

Retributivists, in contrast, do not primarily focus on good or
bad consequences. For a standard sort of retributivist, the moral
assessment of agents—the criminal defendants themselves—
plays a primary role. As explained, even if a utilitarian morally
evaluates agents, that evaluation is secondary to the intrinsic
moral/ethical value of realized states of affairs and the derived
evaluation of choices that lead to them. The moral feature of an
agent that retributivist theories focus on is her desert.31 And an
agent’s desert is conceptually connected to voluntary wrongful
conduct, since “retributive theories of punishment . . . maintain
that punishment is justified because the offender has voluntarily
committed a morally wrong act.”32
utilitarian or welfare-economic view of the nature of individual well-being is.
31. TEN, supra note 4, at 46 (“Contemporary retributivists treat the notion
of desert as central to the retributive theory, punishment being justified in
terms of the desert of the offender.”).
32. Id. The central retributivist idea has been expressed in a number of
ways. See id. at 5 (“Retributivists regard the offender’s wrongdoing as
deserving of punishment, and the amount of punishment should be
proportionate to the extent of wrongdoing. The offender’s desert, and not the
beneficial consequences of punishment, is what justifies punishment”);
Anthony Duff, Legal Punishment, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY
(2001)
[hereinafter
Duff,
Legal
Punishment],
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment/ (“The guilty, those who
commit criminal offences, deserve to be punished: which is to say . . . not merely
that we must not punish the innocent, or punish the guilty more than they
deserve, but that we should punish the guilty, to the extent that they deserve:
penal desert constitutes not just a necessary, but an in principle sufficient
reason for punishment.”); MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW 153 (Oxford Univ. Press 1997) [hereinafter MOORE, PLACING
BLAME] (“[R]etributivism is the view that we ought to punish offenders because
and only because they deserve to be punished. Punishment is justified, for a
retributivist, solely by the fact that those receiving it deserve it.”); WEINREB,
supra note 21, at 327 (“[P]unishment is retribution for the wrong done by the
criminal; it is retrospective, a requirement of justice justified directly and
completely by the past conduct of the person punished . . . . Not only does
retribution justify punishment; it prohibits a relaxation of punishment in order
to accomplish some social good.”).
One of the better known illustrations of the “non-relaxation” aspect of
retributivism comes from Kant:
[W]hoever has committed murder, must die . . . . Even if a
civil society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all
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Retributivism is not just an academic theory. It is operative
in legal opinions as well. To offer a couple of high-profile
examples: In Enmund v. Florida,33 Earl Enmund was sentenced
to death as an accomplice to felony murder.34 Enmund had not
killed anyone.35 Nor did the original plan include killing
anyone.36 Enmund appealed his sentence to the Court, which
reversed, barring Florida from executing him.37 In reversing
Enmund’s death sentence, the Court reasoned:
Here the robbers did commit murder; but they
were subjected to the death penalty only because
they killed as well as robbed. The question before
us is not the disproportionality of death as a
penalty for murder, but rather the validity of
capital punishment for Enmund’s own conduct.
The focus must be on his culpability, not on that
of those who committed the robbery and shot the
victims, for we insist on “individualized
consideration as a constitutional requirement in
imposing the death sentence” . . . . Enmund did
not kill or intend to kill and thus his culpability is
plainly different from that of the robbers who
killed; yet the State treated them alike and
attributed to Enmund the culpability of those who
killed the [victims]. This was impermissible
under the Eighth Amendment.38
its members . . . the last murderer lying in prison ought to be
executed before the resolution was carried out. This ought to
be done in order that every one may realize the desert of his
deeds, and that blood-guiltiness may not remain upon the
people; for otherwise they might all be regarded as
participators in the murder as a public violation of justice.
IMMANUEL KANT, THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT, The Right of Punishing
and of Pardoning § E(I) (W. Hastie trans., 2003) (1790),
http://xet.es/books/Kant/The%20Science%20of%20Right%20Kant.pdf.
33. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
34. The underlying felony was an armed robbery. Id. at 784-85.
35. Id. at 784.
36. See generally id.
37. Id. at 801.
38. Id. at 798 (citations omitted).
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Although Enmund was guilty of felony murder, it was
impermissible to execute him for that crime because, unlike the
others who shot and killed the crime victims, Enmund’s desert
did not warrant that severe a punishment. His culpability was
insufficient.
In Atkins v. Virginia,39 Daryl Atkins was sentenced to death
for capital murder and appealed his sentence to the Court, which
reversed.40 The Court agreed with Atkins’s argument; because
he was mentally retarded, he could not be lawfully sentenced to
death.41 The Court took note of how a consensus among states
to disallow the execution of mentally retarded defendants
“unquestionably reflect[ed] widespread judgment about the
relative culpability of mentally retarded offenders, and the
relationship between mental retardation and the penological
purposes served by the death penalty.”42 And the Court agreed
that, while mentally retarded defendants’ “deficiencies do not
warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions . . . they do
diminish their personal culpability.”43 Further:
With respect to retribution—the interest in seeing
that the offender gets his “just deserts”—the
severity
of
the
appropriate
punishment
necessarily depends on the culpability of the
offender. . . . [O]ur jurisprudence has consistently
confined the imposition of the death penalty to a
narrow category of the most serious crimes.
. . . If the culpability of the average murderer is
insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction
available to the State, the lesser culpability of the
mentally retarded offender surely does not merit
that form of retribution.44
Thus, one significant reason why the Court forbade the
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Id. at 321.
See generally id.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 319.
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execution of Atkins was that Atkins could not have had the
culpability necessary to deserve death for his crime.
As previously mentioned, the retributivist is interested
primarily in a defendant’s desert. Before elaborating the notion
of desert more fully, I should point out that what I take to be a
standard retributivist theory is not a form of consequentialism
that focuses on minimizing the number of persons who fail to be
punished as they deserve to be.45 Unlike utilitarianism’s moral
rationality, the standard moral rationality of retributivism is
neither minimizing nor maximizing. To illustrate one type of
consequentialist theory that I wish to distinguish from what I
take to be a more standard retributivist view, I would like to
consider a particular welfare-economic critique of setting the
level of punishment for a certain crime on the basis of the
retributively fair level.46 The gist of the critique is that the
retributivist adopts a way of assessing the outcomes of
competing legal and policy choices that tends to recommend
choices leading to inferior outcomes, even as those outcomes are
evaluated by retributivist lights.
The consequentialist
retributivist favorably ranks outcomes in which punishments
are properly proportioned to the retributively fair level to fit the
crimes committed. Such outcomes are rated higher than other
outcomes in which punishments are more severe and widely
publicized and thereby manage to scare potential criminals
enough that no crimes are committed. That is, when the
retributively fair punishment is selected, some undeterred
people will commit crimes, and many will get away with them.
Such individuals go unpunished and are therefore treated
unfairly—they do not get what they deserve:

45. According to this type of consequentialist theory, if someone deserves
no punishment and is not punished at all, then she is punished as she deserves
to be (viz., not at all). So this form of retributive consequentialism would
consider a society in which there was no crime and no punishment to be ideally
minimizing (though there would be other ideally minimizing possibilities).
Also, to fail to be punished as one deserves to be, one is either punished more
severely or less severely than one deserves to be. For example, someone who
deserves a little punishment but is not punished at all is not punished as she
deserves to be.
46. See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE
320–29 (Harv Univ. Press 2002).

17

662

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36:3

It is peculiar . . . for retributivists to insist that the
sanction should not exceed the fair ideal . . .
regardless of how much unfairness results with
regard to those who go scot-free . . . . [U]nder the
unfair sanction [that deters], no one . . . receives
unfair treatment. Therefore, when one considers
the unfairness surrounding the punishment of all
the criminals who commit the wrongful act when
the sanction is [fair], one should be troubled. The
[retributive] fairness view, on its own terms,
seems erroneously constrained as it only considers
the [] individuals who are caught and ignores . . .
[those] who are not.47
This critique may pose a problem for a type of retributivist
who emphasizes the comparative evaluation of outcomes on the
basis, a least in part, of how much unjust-because-undeserved
punishment is realized in the outcomes being compared.48 But
such a retributivist does not hold what I take a more standard
sort of retributivist theory to be, especially in regard to how to
justify the imposition of a certain amount of punishment upon a
particular individual on the basis of what he or she has done.
What I understand to be a more standard retributivist view does
not focus on maximizing the value of outcomes in the way the
consequentialist retributivist view targeted by the critique does.
A more standard retributivist view49 also justifies
47. Id. at 325.
48. As explained, to be saddled with the problem that the critique poses,
the consequentialist retributivist would also need to rank situations higher
when the general levels of punishment are set to the retributively fair level.
This sort of retributivist might be able to escape the charge that her position
is erroneous on its own terms if she is prepared to explain how two different
properties of outcomes—(1) the fairness of general levels of punishment and
(2) the amount of unjust because undeserved punishment—are to be traded off
against one another under the chosen retributive social welfare function. If
she can do this, then it might turn out that her theory consistently provides a
high ranking to situations in which there is a lot of unjust because undeserved
punishment, as long as such situations feature general criminal penalties that
are extremely fair. Of course, the price that the retributivist might need to pay
to take this tack is that her weighting of the two different (retributive) fairnessbased properties under the proposed social welfare function would be
extremely implausible.
49. From here on, only a more standard non-consequentialist view will be
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punishment on the basis of desert, but in a different way. When
assessing whether legally to punish a defendant and how much
to punish her, the retributivist focuses on whether she, the
agent, deserves punishment and if so, then how much. Although
judging what an agent deserves is a way of judging the agent
herself, what the agent does also plays an indispensable role:
If a person is deserving of some sort of treatment,
he must, necessarily, be so in virtue of some
possessed characteristic or prior activity. It is
because no one can deserve anything unless there
is some basis or ostensible occasion for the desert
that judgments of desert carry with them a
commitment to the giving of reasons. One cannot
say, for example, that Jones deserves gratitude
although he has done “nothing in particular.” If a
person says that Jones deserves gratitude, then
he must be prepared to answer the question “For
what?” Of course, he may not know the basis of
Jones’s desert, but if he denies that there is any
basis, then he has forfeited his right to use the
terminology of desert. He can still say that we
ought to treat Jones well for “no reason in
particular” of simply “for the sake of being nice,”
but it is absurd to say that Jones deserves good
treatment for no reason in particular. Desert
without a basis is simply not desert.50
Assertions of desert have an implicit structure: “‘S deserves
X in virtue of F,’ where S is a person, X is a mode of treatment,
and F [is] some fact about S. . . .”51 Further, if X is legal
punishment, then F, the fact about S, must be a fact about
something S did.52 F cannot be a fact about S’s status or about
S’s mere thoughts or feelings. The government should not
considered.
50. Joel Feinberg, Justice and Personal Desert, in DOING AND DESERVING:
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 55, 58 (Princeton Univ. Press 1970)
[hereinafter Feinberg, Justice and Personal Desert].
51. Id. at 61.
52. Here I am glossing over the act/omission distinction.
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punish people merely because they have villainous characters or
evil thoughts.53 To say that A deserves a certain amount of legal
punishment is to assess A herself, but, of conceptual necessity,
only in reference to something that A does.54 A’s performing an
act in reference to which a desert-assessment of A coherently can
be made is a conceptually necessary condition for A’s desert. It
is this feature of retributivism that suggests a natural type of
justification of the VAR: (Of course the VAR is justified: (a) legal
punishment is justified by desert, and (b) deserving punishment
is incoherent except in light of something that the criminal
defendant did.)
Any complete justification of the VAR must address not only
the necessity of an act but also the voluntariness of that act.
What is the word “voluntary” doing in MPC § 2.01?55 Why
include it? What, if anything, does it add? As mentioned
previously, the ALI thinks that the term “voluntary” serves at
least to emphasize an agent’s control over her behavior.56 And if
a theory’s main justificatory notion for legal punishment is a
criminal defendant’s desert, then, under that theory, the most
natural reason to think that control is important is that it makes
possible a defendant’s moral responsibility for her conduct. For
a defendant to deserve legal punishment for what she did, she
must be morally responsible for what she did. And moral
responsibility requires sufficient control.
Although desert requires moral responsibility, which in
turn requires sufficient control, some retributivists argue that a
defendant’s desert can turn in part on factors over which the
defendant lacks control. In addition to holding that a voluntary

53. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 cmt. 1 (Official Draft and Explanatory
Notes 1985) (“It is fundamental that a civilized society does not punish for
thoughts alone.”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 explanatory note on subsection
(1) (“a fundamental predicate for all criminal liability [is] that the guilt of the
defendant be based upon conduct, and that the conduct include a voluntary act
or an omission to perform an act of which the defendant was physically capable.
. . . [L]iability cannot be based upon mere thoughts, upon physical conditions,
or upon involuntary movements.”).
54. Here, I am ignoring the act/omission distinction and the point that an
omission can (under a broadly retributivist scheme) be the basis of an agent’s
deserving punishment.
55. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (1962).
56. See supra Part I.
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act is necessary for desert, some57 retributivists argue that when
an agent voluntarily acts, that agent’s desert can be
conceptualized as a function of two elements—culpability and
wrongdoing.58 Culpability is a function of the mens rea, purpose,
knowledge, recklessness, negligence, that accompanies the act.59
Wrongdoing is a function of the badness of the results of the act.
For example, Abbott and Costello both recklessly drive
automobiles in a busy part of town. By happenstance, Abbott
manages not to hit anyone, barely missing Lewis, a pedestrian.
But Costello hits a pedestrian, Clark. Abbott is less deserving
of punishment than Costello,60 even though both are equally
culpable, for Abbott committed less wrongdoing than Costello.
Another example: Abbott negligently drives a car and
unintentionally hits and kills Lewis, a pedestrian. Costello
intentionally sets out to kill a pedestrian, Clark, and
purposefully drives right at Clark, hitting and killing Clark.
57. Some retributivists focus only on culpability and argue that
wrongdoing has no independent moral relevance to an agent’s desert. For
example:
I propose to consider what to make of a doctrine of the
criminal law that seems to me not rationally supportable
. . . . This is the doctrine—the harm doctrine, I’ll call it—that
reduces punishment for intentional wrongdoers (and often
precludes punishment for negligent and reckless wrongdoers)
if by chance the harm they intended or risked does not occur.
Sanford H. Kadish, Supreme Court Review: Foreword: The Criminal Law and
the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 679 (1994).
58. Note that wrongdoing here is being used in a technical sense. The
term does not refer simply to the performance of a wrongful action. As will be
elaborated, wrongdoing refers to the badness of the results of what the
defendant does—worse outcomes mean greater wrongdoing. See MOORE,
PLACING BLAME, supra note 32, at 191 (“both culpability and wrongdoing
matter to one’s just deserts . . . . [T]here are two independent desert-bases,
wrongdoing and culpability. . . . [T]o ask what punishment someone deserves
is to ask how much wrong they did, and with what culpability they did the
wrong.”).
59. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (“Minimum Requirements of Culpability
. . . . [A] person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly,
recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material
element of the offense.”).
60. Here I leave open whether less deserving of punishment refers to
whether Abbott is to be punished at all or to whether Abbott is to be punished
less severely than Costello.
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Abbott is less deserving of punishment than Costello, even
though both have committed the same amount of wrongdoing,
for Abbott is less culpable than Costello.
Michael Moore has elaborated and defended the idea that
culpability and wrongdoing are independent desert-bases.61 And
he has clarified how the relationship between desert and
culpability differs from the relationship between desert and
wrongdoing. Assuming a voluntary act, culpability is both
necessary and sufficient for desert. If an agent acts culpably,
then the agent deserves some legal punishment. If an agent does
not act culpably, then the agent does not deserve any legal
punishment, even if the consequences of the act are really bad.
On the other hand, wrongdoing is neither necessary nor
sufficient for desert. For example, someone might deserve legal
punishment for committing an inchoate crime that did not,
because it was inchoate, generate any particularly harmful
results. Or someone voluntarily but non-culpably might do
something very harmful. In the latter case, a well-constituted
agent would likely feel regret, but she would not deserve legal
punishment. However, if an agent is culpable and, therefore,
deserving of some punishment, then the amount of punishment
deserved is in part a function of wrongdoing. Wrongdoing takes
on independent significance, but only in the presence of
culpability, whereas culpability always has independent
significance on its own.
To summarize: According to retributivism, the justification
of punishment turns on the defendant’s desert. A defendant can
have desert only if she performs an act over which she has the
right sort of control to make her morally responsible for that act.
In addition, she must be culpable in performing the act—that is,
she must have done it purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or
negligently.62 Finally, assuming that she is culpable, her degree
61. See MOORE, PLACING BLAME, supra note 32, at 191–93.
62. Someone might object that strict liability crimes have no mens rea
(culpability) requirement and that therefore a defendant who committed a
strict liability crime could not deserve punishment for having committed it.
However:
There are two ways to construe strict liability crimes: (1) the
crime has no mens rea requirements; or (2) the crime has
mens rea requirements but any mental state on the part of
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of desert can be affected by the badness of the results of her
conduct.
III. The Problem of Moral Luck, the Problem of Free Will, and
the Principle of Alternate Possibilities
As explained, according to the ALI, the VAR requires a
voluntary act to assure that the criminal defendant has the
requisite sort or amount of control over her conduct to legitimize
imposing criminal responsibility upon her for that conduct. And
central to retributivist justifications is the idea that this control
must be sufficient to ground moral responsibility. To identify
and elaborate the sort of control necessary to ground moral
responsibility, it is helpful to consider two related problems—
the problem of moral luck and the problem of free will.
A.

The Problem of Moral Luck

Luck and control are tightly related. Luck can come into
play when control is absent. Games of chance, involving random
events not within anyone’s control, require luck for success.
Games like chess also can involve luck when something is not
within a player’s control. (I’m lucky that my opponent did not
notice that devastating move during her turn at that point in the
game. If she had, then I would have been checkmated within
three moves. Instead, I went on to win.) That luck and lacking
control are connected should not be confused with the stronger,
arguably false, claim that luck is present in all cases in which
there is a lack of control. For example, “[a]n event such as the
rising of the sun this morning was entirely out of one’s control,
yet it is not at all clear that one is lucky the sun rose this
the defendant meets them. To conceive of strict liability in
the first way is to see strict liability crimes as involving a
major departure from fundamental axioms of criminal law,
particularly the principle according to which acts are never
worthy of punishment in the absence of accompaniment by
culpable mental states.
Yaffe, supra note 2, at 188–89. Conceptualizing strict liability crimes in the
second way enables a response to the objection by respecting the fundamental
axiom. Id.
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morning, although it is surely a good thing that it did.”63 So if A
has enough of the right kind of control over a situation, then how
things turn out vis-à-vis A is not a matter of luck. But also,
sometimes how things turn out vis-à-vis A is not a matter of luck
even when A lacks control over a situation.
Additionally, it seems extremely plausible that how morally
to assess A should depend only on factors that are, at least in
some manner and to no small degree, under A’s control.
Whether A is morally responsible for a choice depends, at least
in large part, on whether things are really up to A when A acts
or chooses. Luck is not supposed to have anything to do with
it.64 To the extent that the results of what A does are not up to
A, those results are not relevant to whether a given moral
assessment of A65 is correct.66 This idea generates the problem
63. Andrew Latus, Moral Luck, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(last visited March 19, 2016), http://www.iep.utm.edu/moralluc/.
64. Feinberg, Problematic Responsibilities in Law and Morals, in DOING
& DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 32 (Princeton Univ.
Press 1970) (“Moral responsibility . . . must be something one can neither
escape by good luck nor tumble into through bad luck.”).
65. This should not be confused with the view that the results of A’s
choices, even when not entirely up to A, are irrelevant to the moral assessment
of A’s choices (as permissible, morally required, morally worse than some other
choices, and so forth). The problem of moral luck is a problem that arises when
assessing agents, not their choices.
Also, this idea threatens the notion that wrongdoing is relevant to desert. The
problem of moral luck motivates some retributivists to conceptualize desert as
a function of voluntariness and culpability only. Such retributivists might
argue, for example, that attempted murder should be punished as severely as
murder when luck intervenes to render the attempted murder inchoate and
the mens rea is the same in both cases.
66. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 8
(Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1784).
A good will is not good because of what it effects or
accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed
end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself
. . . . Even if, by a special disfavor of fortune or by the
niggardly provision of a step motherly nature, this will
should wholly lack the capacity to carry out its purpose—if
with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing and
only the good will were left (not, of course, as a mere wish but
as the summoning of all means insofar as they are in our
control)—then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as
something that has its full worth in itself. Usefulness or
fruitlessness can neither add anything to this worth nor take
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of moral luck. Moral luck comes into play “[w]here a significant
aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his
control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object
of moral judgment.”67 The problem posed by moral luck arises
because: (a) at least in many cases, there seems to be such a
thing as moral luck; and (b) both of the following are plausible68
(where “(CP)” refers to the “Control Principle” and “(ML)” refers
to “Moral Luck”):
(CP) We are morally assessable only to the extent
that what we are assessed for depends on factors
under our control.
(ML) [M]oral luck occurs when an agent can be
correctly treated as an object of moral judgment,
despite the fact that a significant aspect of what
he is assessed for depends on factors beyond his
control.69
An example should suffice to show why the idea that there
can be such a thing as moral luck, as characterized by (ML),
seems plausible to many. Abbott shoots at Lewis, and Costello
shoots at Clark. Abbott’s shot is not lethal because, out of
nowhere, Horatio intercedes to take the bullet, striking Horatio’s
arm, that Abbott shoots at Lewis. Costello’s shot is unimpeded
and strikes Clark’s head, instantly killing Clark. Even though
it is beyond Abbott’s and Costello’s control whether there is
someone like Horatio lurking around ready heroically to leap out
of nowhere to shield potential shooting victims, what Abbott
does is not as bad as what Costello does in the sense that what
anything away from it.
Id. at 8.
67. Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 24, 26 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1979).
68. (CP) is plausible in the straightforward sense that, at least on the
surface, it seems true. (ML) is plausible as a definitional statement, because
it seems accurately to articulate the concept that we have in mind when we
speak of moral luck.
69. Dana K. Nelkin, Moral Luck, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (rev. ed. 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-luck/.
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Abbott is morally responsible for is not as bad as what Costello
is morally responsible for. Costello killed someone, but Abbott
did not. Costello is more blameworthy than Abbott. Although
both (CP) and (ML) are plausible, if there are cases of moral luck,
then in such cases we seem faced with the contradiction that
things beyond someone’s control both are and are not
appropriate bases upon which to judge her morally.
How does the problem of moral luck help identify the sort of
control that a criminal defendant must have over her conduct for
her to act voluntarily and, thereby, be morally responsible for
her conduct? The problem of moral luck seems to pose a problem
primarily for what has been termed the harm doctrine, which
“reduces punishment for intentional wrongdoers (and often
precludes punishment for negligent and reckless wrongdoers) if
by chance the harm they intended or risked does not occur.”70
That is, the most obvious target of the problem of moral luck
seems to be the notion that wrongdoing can influence desert.
But other implications of the problem of moral luck come into
view once we consider that wrongdoing is not the only element
of desert over which a defendant might lack control.
To see this more clearly, note that moral luck comes in at
least four different varieties. Resultant luck, illustrated above in
the head-shooting example, is “luck in the way things turn
out.”71 Circumstantial luck is “luck in one’s circumstances . . . .
70. Kadish, supra note 57, at 679.
71. Nelkin, supra note 69. Consider another example of resultant luck,
involving a truck driver running over a child:
The driver, if he is entirely without fault, will feel terrible
about his role in the event, but will not have to reproach
himself. Therefore this example of agent-regret is not yet a
case of moral bad luck. However, if the driver was guilty of
even a minor degree of negligence . . . then if that negligence
contributes to the death of the child, he will not merely feel
terrible. He will blame himself for the death. And what
makes this an example of moral luck is that he would have to
blame himself only slightly for the negligence itself if no
situation arose which required him to brake suddenly and
violently to avoid hitting a child. Yet the negligence is the
same in both cases, and the driver has no control over
whether a child will run into his path.
Nagel, supra note 67, at 28–29.
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The things we are called upon to do, the moral tests we face, are
importantly determined by factors beyond our control.”72
Constitutive luck concerns “the kind of person you are, where
this is not just a question of what you deliberately do, but of your
inclinations, capacities, and temperament.”73 And causal luck is
“luck in how one is determined by antecedent circumstances.”74
Causal luck suggests that the amount of harm that a
defendant actually causes is not the only element of desert over
which a defendant might lack control. As discussed, the harm
actually caused is affected by factors external to the agent that
the agent does not control. It is for this reason that it seems
questionable to many to consider wrongdoing, in the technical
sense of the term, a variable that can affect an agent’s moral
responsibility, and therefore her desert. But if we limit the
factors relevant to assessing an agent’s moral responsibility to
those internal to the agent, then we escape the problem that
arises from treating wrongdoing as a desert-basis. We can
“admit that moral responsibility for external harm makes no
sense and argue that moral responsibility is . . . restricted to the
inner world of the mind . . . for here is a domain where things
happen without the consent of uncooperative nature.”75 The
agent, after all, is in control of her own mind.
But this strategy takes us only so far. Joel Feinberg
suggests an example involving two virtually identical
aggressors—Hotspur and Witwood. Each aggressor is imagined,

72. Nagel, supra note 67, at 33.
73. Id. at 28. To elaborate:
Since our genes, care-givers, peers, and other environmental
influences all contribute to making us who we are (and since
we have no control over these) it seems that who we are is at
least largely a matter of luck. Since how we act is partly a
function of who we are, the existence of constitutive luck
entails that what actions we perform depends on luck, too.
Nelkin, supra note 69.
74. Nagel, supra note 67, at 28. Arguably, the category of causal luck is
superfluous “because circumstantial and constitutive luck seem to cover the
same territory. Constitutive luck covers what we are, while circumstantial
luck covers what happens to us. Nothing else seems to remain that can play a
role in determining what we do.” Latus, supra note 63.
75. Feinberg, Justice and Personal Desert, supra note 50, at 33.
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in separate incidents, to slap a victim called Hemo in the face.
Hemo turns out to be a hemophiliac. When Hotspur slaps Hemo
he cuts Hemo’s mouth, and Hemo bleeds to death. When
Witwood strikes Hemo something external, that is, not involving
Witwood’s mind, happens that prevents Hemo’s death.
Comparatively speaking, Hotspur is morally unlucky because he
is responsible for greater wrongdoing—Hemo’s death instead of
Hemo’s nonfatal injury—than Witwood.
Witwood enjoys
morally better fortune. Feinberg asks us to imagine “rewinding”
the episode in each case to a point before the aggressor slaps
Hemo:
The same good fortune is possible at earlier
“internal” stages. For example, at the stage when
Hotspur would begin to burn with rage, a speck of
dust throws Witwood into a sneezing fit,
preventing any rage from arising. He can no more
be responsible for a feeling he did not have than
for a death that did not happen. Similarly, at the
point when Hotspur would be right on the verge of
forming his intention, Witwood is distracted at
just that instant by a loud noise. By the time the
noise subsides, Witwood’s blood has cooled, and he
forms no intention to slap Hemo . . . . [I]n whatever
sense legal responsibility for external states can
be contingent on factors beyond one’s control and
therefore a matter of luck, in precisely the same
sense can “moral” responsibility for inner states
also be contingent and a matter of luck.76
To put this idea another way, causal luck can affect what
happens inside the head, just as resultant luck can affect what
happens outside the head. The problem of moral luck therefore
points toward a sort of actor’s control that seems necessary to
ground the actor’s moral responsibility. That type of control
needs to overcome how causal luck affects what goes on in the
actor’s head when she voluntary acts.

76. Id. at 35.
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The Problem of Free Will

Causal luck also plays a role in a similar problem concerning
the relationship between free will and determinism, sometimes
called the problem of free will. The rough idea behind the
problem of free will is: If everything we do is causally
determined, then it is not really up to us what we do—we are not
really free because we are not really in control of what we do.
On the other hand, if what we do is not causally determined by
anything, then, again, we are not really free because we are not
really in control of what we do. If nothing determines what we
do, then neither do we. So although, intuitively, it seems as if it
is really up to us what we do, at least sometimes, the foregoing
seems to rule this out as a possibility—hence, the problem.
It is important to formulate the problem of free will precisely
to decide whether it admits of a possible resolution and to
understand what differences there may be among competing
solutions. A set of standard terms has been developed to help
accomplish this. I shall adopt the definitions offered by one
expert, Peter van Inwagen:77
“Determinism is the thesis that the past and the
laws of nature together determine, at every
moment, a unique future . . . .”78
Indeterminism is “[t]he denial of determinism
. . . .”79
The Free-Will Thesis is the thesis that “we are
sometimes in the following position with respect
to a contemplated future act: we simultaneously
have both the following abilities: the ability to
perform that act and the ability to refrain from
performing that act (This entails that we have
been in the following position: for something we
did do, we were at some point prior to our doing it
77. See generally van Inwagen, How to Think, supra note 9.
78. Id. at 330 (emphasis added).
79. Id. (emphasis added).
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able to refrain from doing it, able not to do it).”80
“Compatibilism is the thesis that determinism
and the free-will thesis could both be true. . . .”81
“[I]ncompatibilism
compatibilism.”82

is

the

denial

of

“Libertarianism is the conjunction of the free-will
thesis and incompatibilism (Libertarianism thus
entails indeterminism).”83
“Soft determinism is the conjunction of
determinism and the free-will thesis (Soft
determinism thus entails compatibilism).”84
With these definitions at hand, we can formulate the
problem of free will as follows: “Free will seems to be
incompatible both with determinism and indeterminism. Free
will seems, therefore, to be impossible. But free will also seems
to exist. The impossible therefore seems to exist. A solution
. . . would be a way to resolve this apparent contradiction.”85
One possible solution would be to deny the existence of free
will, to deny the free-will thesis. But if we deny the free-will
thesis, then we run into trouble holding two other theses, both
of which seem to be correct.86 The first is that ought implies can.
If A lacks the ability to do, or refrain from doing, something, then
A could not be morally required to do, or refrain from doing, it.
80. Id. at 329 (emphasis added). Famously, Harry Frankfurt raised a
potential problem concerning this way of formulating the free-will thesis if we
understand the free-will thesis as necessary for moral responsibility. See infra
Part II.C where I shall consider and adopt Frankfurt’s point.
81. van Inwagen, How to Think, supra note 9, at 330 (emphasis added).
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. Peter van Inwagen, Free Will Remains a Mystery: The Eighth
Philosophical Perspectives Lecture, 14 PHIL. PERSP. 1, 11 (2000) [hereinafter
van Inwagen, Free Will Remains].
86. Although some might dispute these two theses, this paper assumes
that both are true.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/1

30

2016

RETRIBUTIVISM, AGENCY, AND THE V.A.R.

675

For example, I could not morally be required to fly like Captain
Marvel.
If Laurel and Hardy are two random strangers who happen
to meet, then it seems obvious, in the absence of any
extraordinary countervailing factors, that Laurel should not kill
Hardy. If the free will thesis is false, however, then whenever
Laurel is faced with a choice at a certain time and makes a
particular decision, the decision that Laurel makes turns out to
be the only one that Laurel had the ability to make at that time.
But then, if Laurel kills Hardy, then Laurel never had the ability
to refrain from killing Hardy. So if we deny the free will thesis
while trying to hold onto the thesis that ought implies can, then
we must give up the idea that if Laurel kills Hardy, then Laurel
does something that Laurel ought not to have done. Further, if
Laurel was not morally required to refrain from killing Hardy,
then it becomes difficult to see how to justify: (a) having a system
of legal punishment under which killers are punished, at least
in part, because they are morally responsible for killing and (b)
punishing Laurel under that system. For when Laurel killed
Hardy, Laurel did not do anything morally impermissible.
The second, related thesis that is threatened by denying the
free-will thesis is that A is sometimes morally responsible for
what A does.87 If every action88 that A performs is the only one
that A in fact ever has the ability to perform, then it seems
implausible to ascribe moral responsibility to A for anything that
A does. The threat that A is never morally responsible for what
A does persists, even when we ignore the external aspects of
what A does and focus only on what might be termed A’s volition,

87. The notion of moral responsibility here is:
[A]n absolute responsibility wholly within the power of the
agent . . . . To be morally responsible . . . is not [in itself] to be
liable to any kind of official action or even to unofficial
informal responses such as acts of blaming.
Moral
responsibility . . . is liability to charges and credits on some
ideal record, liability to credit or blame . . . . This record in
turn can be used for any one of a variety of purposes—as a
basis for self-punishment, remorse, or pride, for example.
Feinberg, Justice and Personal Desert, supra note 50, at 30–31.
88. Here, I am glossing over the difference between acting and omitting.

31

676

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36:3

the executory89 mental state that occurs in A’s brain just before
A acts. If every facet of A’s internal psychological life is uniquely
determined by past events, in principle, that occur before A is
even born, in combination with the laws of nature, then causal
luck affects even the formation of A’s volitions.90 Thus, the issue
illustrated earlier by the example involving Hotspur, Witwood,
and Hemo arises again, this time in connection with the problem
of free will. If Hotspur forms the volition to strike Hemo, then
that volition is the only volition that was ever within Hotspur’s
ability to form. So whether Hotspur forms the volition to strike
Hemo is a matter of Hotspur’s luck. When even Hotspur’s
volitions are in this sense not under Hotspur’s control, it begins
to seem impossible for Hotspur ever to be morally responsible for
what he does. So solving the problem of free will by denying the
free-will thesis seems off the table for anyone who thinks that
we are ever morally responsible for what we do.91
Assuming that the free-will thesis is true and that we are at
least sometimes morally responsible for what we do, there seems
to be two ways to show how free will is possible—either
convincingly argue that determinism is compatible with the freewill thesis or convincingly argue that indeterminism is. At first
blush, it may seem that the best option is to argue that
indeterminism is compatible with free will.
Causal
determination by factors entirely outside of one’s control seems
89. See infra Part IV where I clarify the idea that a volition is a type of
executory mental state, a type of intention.
90. Nagel, supra note 67, at 35.
If one cannot be responsible for consequences of one’s acts due
to factors beyond one’s control, or for antecedents of one’s acts
that are properties of temperament not subject to one’s will,
or for the circumstances that pose one’s moral choices, then
how can one be responsible even for the stripped-down acts
of the will itself, if they are the product of antecedent
circumstances outside of the will’s control?
Id.
91. Since retributivists think that justly punished criminals must have
been morally responsible for committing their crimes, I shall assume that
retributivists accept the free-will thesis. It is not as clear that utilitarians
must accept the free-will thesis, since utilitarian justifications of punishment
do not primarily turn on whether the criminal defendant is morally responsible
for what she does.
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to pose the more serious threat to moral responsibility. If factors
over which I lack any control determine everything that I do, or
even think, feel, or will, then how can anything that I do ever
really be up to me in the manner that the free-will thesis
suggests?
But at least certain forms of indeterminism also seem
incompatible with the free-will thesis. These include non-causal
and event-causal varieties.
According to non-causal
indeterminism, “actions are free if the simple [mental] actions at
their core are uncaused.”92 But if the cores of such actions are
uncaused, then the agent does not cause them and, therefore,
does not control them. The problem seems just as vexing when
nothing has control as when something other than the agent
does.93
According to event-causal indeterminism, certain agentinvolving events cause those of an agent’s actions for which the
agent is morally responsible. When those agent-involving
events non-deterministically cause a free action:
[T]he agent exercises . . . a certain variety of active
control (which is said to consist in the action’s
being caused . . . by those agent-involving events),
the action is performed for a reason, and there
remains, until she acts, a chance of the agent’s not
performing that action.94

92. Timothy O’Connor, Why Agent Causation?, 24 PHIL. TOPICS 143, 146
(1996) [hereinafter O’Connor, Why Agent Causation?].
93. ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 292 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1981) (“Random acts and caused acts alike seem to leave us not as the .
. . originators of action but as an arena, a place where things happen, whether
through earlier causes or spontaneously.”). Along similar lines:
An action’s being non-determined . . . is not sufficient for it to
be free . . . . If we acted in the way uranium 238 emits alpha
particles, determinism would be false but (unless we are
greatly mistaken about uranium 238) we would not thereby
have free will.
Id. at 299.
94. Randolph Clarke & Justin Capes, Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic)
Theories of Free Will, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (rev. ed.
2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/.
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But such agent-involving events do not seem to provide the
agent the requisite control any more than uncaused events do.
“[T]he relevant causal conditions antecedent to a decision
. . . would leave it open whether this decision will occur . . . .
[A]nd whether [the decision occurs] is not settled by the agent.
Hence, the agent lacks the control required for being morally
responsible for the decision.”95
So where does this leave us? It would seem that the
retributivist must choose between libertarianism and soft
determinism.96 These two positions yield competing solutions to
the problem of free will that might preserve moral responsibility,
since according to both, the free-will thesis is true. Consider the
following two propositions:
(1)   When the moment of choice arrives, A has the
ability to do X and the ability not to do X.
(2)   Given the past, before A’s birth, and the laws
of nature, it is uniquely determined, even
before A is born, that A does X when the
moment of choice arrives.
If we understand the term ability in (1) to refer to the sort
of control that an agent must have over her conduct to be morally
responsible for it, then the libertarian thinks that (1) and (2)
could not both be true. The libertarian’s intuition is that because
neither the past state of the world, before A’s birth, nor the laws
of nature are at all up to A, anything that the past and the laws
of nature necessitate is not up to A either. A could not have the
ability not to do something, here, X, that is necessitated that
way.
The soft determinist, in contrast, sees no problem with (1)
and (2) both being true. The soft determinist adopts the view
that A has the ability to do or not to do X, provided that A would
95. Derk Pereboom, Is Our Conception of Agent-Causation Coherent?, 32
PHIL. TOPICS 275, 276 (2004).
96. By way of reminder: Libertarianism is the conjunction of the free-will
thesis and incompatibilism. Soft determinism is the conjunction of the free-will
thesis and determinism.
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have done or not have done X had A chosen to or not to.97 Once
we understand A’s ability to do X to amount to A would have
done X if A had chosen to, the tension with determinism is
eliminated. As the soft determinist might say: So what if A was
necessitated by factors completely beyond A’s control not to choose
to do X at the moment of choice? A had the ability to do X because
A would have done X if A had chosen to.
To justify the VAR in relation to a defendant’s desert, the
retributivist must deal with the problem of moral luck and the
problem of free will in a way that preserves moral responsibility.
To do that, the retributivist must adopt either libertarianism or
soft determinism. This paper argues that the most plausible
option for the retributivist is to adopt libertarianism in
combination with a view called agent causalism, according to
which we are the causes of our conduct when we voluntarily act
and are morally responsible for what we do, as opposed to events
that cause our conduct. For retributivist justifications of the
VAR to be plausible, agent causalism must be true.
Before proceeding to that argument, it is important to
reconsider an important aspect of how the problem of free will is
formulated. The standard type of formulation outlined above
presupposes what has been termed the Principle of Alternate
Possibilities (“PAP”). The PAP, however, has been seriously
called into question. So before continuing with the main line of
argument, I shall explain, following a well-known observation by
Harry Frankfurt,98 why the PAP is false and consider whether
this has any impact on the retributivist’s choice between
libertarianism and soft determinism.
C.

The Principle of Alternate Possibilities
Recall the free-will thesis:

97. To put it a slightly different way, assume that A chose not to do X and
was determined so to choose. The soft determinist holds that A had the ability
to do X as long as: A would have done X if A had formed the volition to do X.
Presumably, it would have been A’s volition to do X that caused A’s doing X
had A formed that volition.
98. See generally Harry G. Frankfurt, Alternate Possibilities and Moral
Responsibility, 66 J. PHIL. 829 (1969).
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[W]e are sometimes in the following position with
respect to a contemplated future act: we
simultaneously have both the following abilities:
the ability to perform that act and the ability to
refrain from performing that act (This entails that
we have been in the following position: for
something we did do, we were at some point prior
to our doing it able to refrain from doing it, able
not to do it.).99
If we understand free will to be important at least in part
because it secures the possibility of moral responsibility, then
formulating the free-will thesis this way seems implicitly to
presuppose the PAP: “[A] person is morally responsible for what
he has done only if he could have done otherwise.”100 Despite the
PAP’s initial plausibility, Harry Frankfurt provided a
persuasive reason to think it false:
[T]here may be circumstances that make it
impossible for a person to avoid performing some
action without those circumstances in any way
bringing it about that he performs that action. It
would surely be no good for the person to refer to
circumstances of this sort in an effort to absolve
himself of moral responsibility for performing the
action in question. For those circumstances, by
hypothesis, actually had nothing to do with his
having done what he did.101
To illustrate his main idea, Frankfurt creates an example in
which someone called Black is prepared to take steps to assure
that another person, Jones, does what Black wants Jones to do.
(Frankfurt emphasizes that the idea that it is a person—Black—
that is doing this is irrelevant; a non-personal causal agency
would do just as well.) What Black’s steps are is left to the
imagination of the reader, as long as the reader would
99. van Inwagen, How to Think, supra note 9, at 329.
100. Frankurt, supra note 98, at 829.
101. Id. at 837.
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acknowledge that those steps assure that Jones can do only what
Black wants Jones to do.102
Frankfurt’s example:
Suppose someone—Black, let us say—wants
Jones[] to perform a certain action. Black is
prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his
way, but he prefers to avoid showing his hand
unnecessarily. So he waits until Jones[] is about
to make up his mind what to do, and he does
nothing unless it is clear to him (Black is an
excellent judge of such things) that Jones[] is
going to decide to do something other than what
he wants him to do. If it does become clear that
Jones[] is going to decide to do something else,
Black takes effective steps to ensure that Jones[]
decides to do, and that he does do, what [Black]
wants him to do. Whatever Jones[]’s initial
preferences and inclinations, then, Black will
have his way . . . . Now suppose that Black never
has to show his hand because Jones[], for reasons
of his own, decides to perform and does perform
the very action Black wants him to perform. In
that case, it seems clear, Jones[] will bear
precisely the same moral responsibility for what
he does as he would have borne if Black had not
been ready to take steps to ensure that he do it. It
would be quite unreasonable to excuse Jones[] for
his action, or to withhold the praise to which it
would normally entitle him, on the basis of the
102. See generally id. at 835.
What steps will Black take, if he believes he must take steps,
in order to ensure that Jones[] decides and acts as [Black]
wishes? Anyone with a theory concerning what “could have
done otherwise” means may answer this question for himself
by describing whatever measures he would regard as
sufficient to guarantee that, in the relevant sense, Jones[]
cannot do otherwise.
Id.
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fact that he could not have done otherwise.103
Because he concludes that the PAP is false, Frankfurt
proposes a similar, modified version that he thinks may be true.
Call it the “PAP′”: “[A] person is not morally responsible for what
he has done if he did it only because he could not have done
otherwise.”104 The force of the term because in the PAP′ is not
justificatory, but explanatory. That is, if the correct causal
explanation of how someone behaves on a certain occasion
includes her inability to behave in any other way on that
occasion, then she is not morally responsible for her behavior on
that occasion.
As previously explained, the retributivist who wants to
justify the VAR faces a choice between libertarianism and soft
determinism. Facially, the PAP′ is consistent with either
position. If causal determinism is true, then, according to the
libertarian, no one is ever morally responsible for what she does
because her conduct is always caused by factors, such as the
history of the world and the deterministic laws of nature, that
guarantee that she could not have done otherwise. It is largely
for that very reason that the libertarian endorses
indeterminism. The soft determinist would agree that those
same factors, the history of the world and the laws of nature,
always ultimately necessitate someone’s behavior. But the soft
determinist would insist that those factors are consistent with
her ability, at the time of choice, to do otherwise. She could have
done otherwise because she would have done otherwise if she
had chosen to. In other words, the soft determinist can accept
the PAP′ and determinism simultaneously, without concern that
our status as morally responsible agents is in peril.
In light of the problem of free will, is there any reason for a
retributivist who aspires to justify the VAR not to be a soft
determinist? I submit that there is and that it is compelling.
Soft determinism’s view about when it is within someone’s
ability105 to do something is extremely implausible. If every
detail of A’s psychology over the course of A’s entire life is
103. Id. at 835–36.
104. Id. at 838.
105. Here, a person’s ability to do something must encompass the sort of
control necessary to ground moral responsibility for doing that thing.
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necessitated by factors entirely outside of A’s control, then it is
extremely implausible that A has the ability to do X simply
because A would have done X had A chosen to. Human persons
like A have beliefs and desires that, at least sometimes, can
rationally influence and explain how they behave. A tornado, in
contrast, is not that sort of thing. And A’s being the sort of thing
that can make choices on the basis of reasons, by entering into
various intentional106 states that play a role in causing those
choices, seems to be a necessary condition for A to be the sort of
thing that properly can be subject to moral assessment. But
being capable of choosing for reasons by entering into intentional
states is not sufficient for moral responsibility. If the existence,
content, and causal effects of A’s mental states are entirely
outside of A’s control—if they are not at all up to A—then it is
hard to see how those mental states, or counterfactual claims
about choices resulting from them, could explain how A could be
more of a morally responsible agent than a tornado could ever
be. And it would be absurd to claim that a tornado might deserve
legal punishment for its conduct.
One of the statements in the formulation of the problem of
moral luck considered in Part III.A was:
(CP) We are morally assessable only to the extent
that what we are assessed for depends on factors
under our control.
The soft determinist’s conception of control cannot justify
the sort of moral assessment to which (CP) refers.107
106. Here, the noun form of intentional is the technical term
intentionality. Intentionality refers to “that property of many mental states
and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of
affairs in the world.” JOHN R. SEARLE, The Nature of Intentional States, in
INTENTIONALITY: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 1 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1983). Intentionality here means aboutness, not purposiveness.
“[I]ntending to do something is just one form of [i]ntentionality along with
belief, hope, fear, desire, and lots of others.” Id. at 3.
107. Beyond what I have written in the preceding paragraph, I have
nothing worthwhile to offer the soft determinist that might convince her that
her view is incorrect. And I recognize that there are many capable, convinced
soft determinists. Soft determinists need to explain how their conception of an
agent’s control makes defensible the moral assessment of the agent. And there
is an enormous literature that tries to do that. Addressing those arguments
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IV. Agent Causalism
In light of the problem of free will, therefore, it seems that
libertarianism is the way to go for retributivists seeking to
justify the VAR. As explained earlier, however, the idea that
some events are uncaused or that some events nondeterministically cause free choices does not help make room for
moral responsibility or desert. This is where agent causalism
comes in.
Whenever A voluntarily does something, we can ask
whether A, the agent, is ever the cause of what A does.
Alternatively, we can ask whether it is always some event or
chain of, perhaps neurophysiological, events—distinct from A—
that causes what A does. Those who hold that only events ever
stand in direct causal relations are called event-causalists;108
and those who think that sometimes agents stand in direct
causal relations to events are called agent-causalists. Eventcausalists believe that all causes are events and that,
correspondingly, there is only one kind of basic causal relation—
a relation whose subject and object are both events. “[T]he
event-causalist [contends] that the causation of events intrinsic
to . . . actions by the intendings [i.e., volitions] of an agent is just
a matter of ‘ordinary’ event-causation.”109 An agent-causalist,
on the other hand, believes that voluntary actions involve an
irreducible causal relation whose subject is the agent herself.
According to agent-causalism, some causes are substances,110
exceeds what I can do in this paper.
108. See John Bishop, Agent-causation, 92 MIND 61 (1983).
Does every intentional action involve an irreducible causal
relation whose subject is, not an event or sequence of events,
but the agent himself? Those who say not [can be called]
event-causalists . . . . To them, the causal component in
intentional action is a matter of ‘ordinary’ causal relations
amongst events, and the explanation of behaviour as
intentional action is just a species of ‘ordinary’ causal
explanation.
Id. at 61.
109. Id. at 63.
110. The term “substances” is a metaphysical term. But although it is
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called agents, and there is a corresponding distinctive and
irreducible form of agent-causal relation in addition to the type
of causal relation that can hold between events.
This
irreducible111 agent-causal relation constitutes an agent’s
control over her actions. And this sort of control makes an agent
morally responsible for her choices because it is a distinctive sort
of power: “[A] causal power, fundamentally as a substance, to
cause a decision without being causally determined to do so.”112
Timothy O’Connor offers further elaboration:
Wherever the agent-causal relation obtains, the
agent bears a property or set of properties that is
‘choice-enabling’ (i.e., in virtue of such properties,
the agent has a type of causal power which . . . we
may term “active power”).
But this ‘active
power’—the causal power in virtue of which one
has freedom of will—is not characterized by any
function from circumstances to effects (as is the
case with event causal powers). For the properties
that confer such a capacity do not themselves . . .
necessitate or make probable a certain effect.
Rather, they . . . make possible the direct,
purposive bringing about of an effect by the agent
who bears them. Such properties thus play a
different functional role in the associated causal
process . . . . [T]hese properties give rise to a
fundamentally different type of causal power—
abstract, it should not be considered unclear, abstruse, or highfalutin. “There
is an ordinary concept in play when philosophers discuss ‘substance’, and this
. . . is the concept of object, or thing when this is contrasted with properties or
events.” Howard Robinson, Substance, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (rev. ed. 2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/.
111. “Irreducible” refers to the impossibility of reducing an agent-causal
relation in terms of event-causal relations alone. In other words, agentcausation is not ultimately a complicated form of event-causation in disguise.
Agent-causation is a fundamental sort of causation, just as the fundamental
forces of physics are not reducible to one unifying force. (At least, so far as I
know, the fundamental forces of physics have not been unified yet—maybe
they will be, and maybe they will not. If we discover that the fundamental
forces are unified, we would realize that they were not really fundamental in
the way we thought they were.)
112. Pereboom, supra note 95, at 278.
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one that in suitable circumstances is exercised at
will by the agent, rather than of necessity, as with
objects that are not partly self-determining
agents.113
This power must also be reasons-responsive—the agent can
act rationally, for reasons, when she exercises this power.
Reasons must be capable of guiding, explaining, and justifying
what an agent does when she freely acts. In other words, when
an agent voluntarily acts, the agent-causal power operates in
concert with her intentional states, beliefs, desires, etc., such
that the contents of those states play an indispensable role in
explaining what the agent does.
Acting with moral
responsibility requires the capacity to act on the basis of
practical reason.114
Obviously missing from the explanation of agent causalism
offered thus far is a detailed specification of the set of properties
and circumstances such that, if a substance has those properties
in those circumstances, then the substance is an agent that can
directly bring about an event in response to reasons to do so. But
there is not anything incoherent or implausible about there
being such a specification, if only we could identify it. A pane of
113. O’Connor, Why Agent Causation?, supra note 92, at 145. Along
similar lines:
[T]he agency theory . . . affirms the completely general claim
. . . that objects have causal powers in virtue of their
properties, so that objects sharing the same properties share
the same causal capacities . . . . [S]ome properties contribute
to the causal powers of the objects that bear them in a very
different way from the event-causal paradigm, in which an
object’s possession of property P in circumstance C
necessitates or makes probable a certain effect. On this
alternative picture, a property of the right sort can (in
conjunction with appropriate circumstances) make possible
the direct, purposive bringing about of an effect by the agent
who bears it.
Timothy O’Connor, Agent Causation, in AGENTS, CAUSES, AND EVENTS: ESSAYS
ON INDETERMINISM AND FREE WILL 173, 177 (Timothy O’Connor ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 1995) [hereinafter O’Connor, Agent Causation].
114. See infra Part V where I shall elaborate how agent-causal power
might fit within a picture of how an agent acts for reasons by considering the
anatomy of a voluntary act.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/1

42

2016

RETRIBUTIVISM, AGENCY, AND THE V.A.R.

687

glass is fragile, and in certain circumstances it will either
certainly shatter or have a high probability of shattering.
Presumably, there is a detailed technical specification of the
micro-structural properties of the pane of glass that, if only we
could identify it, would illuminate why the pane of glass behaves
that way in those circumstances.115
What rules out a
specification of a thing’s properties and a set of circumstances
that illuminates why that thing, and any other thing that has
those properties in those types of circumstances, is capable of
being an agent that can directly cause an event in response to
reasons?
Of course, we eventually might learn enough,
empirically, about how our brains work that we become
convinced that there is no accurate specification of our
properties in any set of circumstances that could explain how we
could be agents.116 If that were to happen, then retributivist
approaches to justifying the VAR would be in serious trouble.
How does agent-causation empower people to be morally
responsible for what they do? When an actor freely acts, she
agent-causes117 her decision to do so. Actors are morally
responsible for what they do when they agent-cause their
decisions to act. A Frankfurt-style scenario suggested by
William Rowe can help clarify this idea. Imagine that Jones is
deciding whether (a) to keep some money that does not belong to
him or (b) to return the money to its rightful owner, who needs

115. I suspect that we already have such a specification available, based
on our empirically-acquired knowledge of glass.
116. For example, one empirical study seems to indicate that certain
voluntary decisions are caused by brain activity that occurs before the subject
is conscious of making a decision. This suggests that it is not the subject
herself who causes the voluntary conduct—preconscious brain events and
brain states cause it instead. See Benjamin Libet et al., Time of Conscious
Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential):
The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act, 106 BRAIN 623 (1983).
Although I do not believe that this study, standing alone, is a serious threat to
agent causalism, if enough sophisticated studies of complex human decision
making were performed that generated results inconsistent with the agentcausalist picture, then agent causalism would be falsified, as least as to us. It
would turn out that even if there were agents, we would not be included among
them.
117. To say that an actor agent-causes an event is to mean that the abovementioned irreducible causal relation (whose subject is the actor herself) is
realized and that the event occurs in virtue of that causal relation being
realized.
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that money more than Jones does. Jones thinks that the morally
right thing to do is to return the money. But he selfishly decides
to keep it for himself under the following conditions:
No outside influence or internal desire or want
caused him to decide to keep the money. He was
free to cause and free not to cause his decision to
keep the money. As it happened, he followed his
selfish desire, rather than the advice of his
conscience, and [agent-caused] his decision to
keep the money, having it within his power,
nevertheless, not to have [agent-caused] that
decision. However, had he been about to [agentcause] the decision to return the money, the devil,
let us suppose, would have directly caused in him
the decision to keep the money, effectively
preventing any decision or action on his part to
return the money . . . . In a way, given the steady
resolve of the devil, it is up to our agent whether
he himself or the devil will be responsible for his
decision to keep the money. By exercising his
power to [agent-cause] his decision to keep the
money, he makes himself responsible for that
decision. Had he not [agent-caused] that decision,
the devil, and not he, would have been responsible
for his decision to keep the money. And had he not
[agent-caused] his decision to keep the money,
then, at long last, we would have a case in which
someone might truthfully say: “the devil made me
do it.”118
In this example, when the devil does not make Jones keep
the money, Jones agent-causes his decision to keep it. And when
the devil makes Jones do it, Jones does not agent-cause his
decision—the devil causes it by causing in Jones a necessitating
volition to keep the money, which in turn causes Jones to keep
it. Only when the devil does not make him do it is Jones morally
responsible for keeping the money. And it is up to Jones whether
he is morally responsible, since Jones is in control of whether or

118. William L. Rowe, Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and the Problem of
“Oomph,” 10 J. ETHICS 295, 299 (2006).
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not he agent-causes the decision. If it were a crime for Jones to
keep the money, then, in principle, Jones might deserve legal
punishment for keeping the money if the devil did not make him
do it. And all of this is true even though Jones could not have
done otherwise than to keep the money.
As stated previously, this paper’s main thesis is that for
retributivist justifications of the VAR to be plausible, agent
causalism must be true. This thesis is significant because agent
causalism is contentious and may be false. And if agent
causalism is false, then retributivism could not play any role in
substantiating the VAR, the fundamental legal precondition of
ever imposing criminal liability upon anyone. To be contentious,
agent causalism must, to some degree, be plausible. If agent
causalism were entirely implausible, no one would take it
seriously as a possibility. And to be at all plausible, agent
causalism must at least be coherent. Although my objective is
not thoroughly to defend agent causalism, I must explain how
agent causalism is coherent and has at least some plausibility.
Otherwise, this paper’s main thesis would not be significant in
the way that I claim.119
Why might someone think that agent causalism is
incoherent or extremely implausible? Before considering what I
take to be two of the more challenging objections to agent
causalism, let me quickly address what I consider to be, at most,
a couple of superficial reasons to dismiss agent causalism. A
critic might believe that agent causalism is committed to nonphysical substances, souls, say, or to supernatural phenomena
and that such commitments are farfetched. Whether or not such
things are farfetched, agent causalism is not committed to them.
An agent causalist does think that agents are substances (things
other than properties or events) and that this is important. An
agent causalist also thinks: (a) that these substances are able to
cause events without being determined to do so; (b) that these
119. If agent causalism were incoherent or entirely implausible, then this
paper’s main thesis would still be significant. For if it were obvious that agent
causalism was incoherent or for some other reason was not true, then it would
follow from this paper’s thesis that there would be no plausible way for
retributivist justifications of the VAR to work. But I think that there may be
a plausible way for retributivist justifications of the VAR to work. At least, I
am not prepared to rule out such a possibility. So I must explain how agent
causalism is coherent and is at least somewhat plausible.
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substances can thereby be morally responsible for their conduct;
and (c) that (a) and (b) are important. But there is no reason to
think that according to agent causalism agents are non-physical
or that agent-causation is not a natural type of causal relation.120
For example, an agent causalist might think that organisms
that can agent-cause events came to exist through evolutionary
processes driven largely by natural selection, just as organisms
that can fly, such as birds, came to exist through evolutionary
processes driven largely by natural selection. There is no more
reason to think that agents are non-physical or that the causal
relations involved in an agent’s ability to agent-cause events are
supernatural than there is to think that birds are non-physical
or that the causal relations involved in a bird’s ability to fly are
supernatural.
There are, however, more engaging objections to agent
causalism. One such objection concludes that either agent
causalism is false or, even if true, agent causalism can account
for an agent’s control over her conduct no better than the view
that free actions are triggered by uncaused events can. Recall
that uncaused events seem unable to make moral responsibility
possible because an event under nothing’s control is not under
an actor’s control. So if the actor’s, allegedly, free actions are
caused by uncaused events, then her, allegedly, free actions are
not under her control, and she therefore could not be morally
responsible for them.
The objection can be posed as follows: Every episode of agent
causation features an agent, S, bringing about an event, e. So
every episode of agent causation is itself a complex event with
the structure: S’s causing e. Call that complex structured event
“E.” What causes E? There seem to be only two available
answers—either some earlier event causes E or S does. If an
earlier event causes E, then we face anew the same problem that
agent causalism was supposed to help us solve. Either that
previous event was uncaused, or caused—maybe remotely—by
an uncaused event, or determinism is true. But if S causes E,
then an infinite regress ensues. For S to be morally responsible
for conduct on a certain occasion, S must agent-cause an infinite

120. An agent causalist might think such things, but agent causalism
does not imply them.
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number of events on that occasion: e; E; (S’s causing E); (S’s
causing (S’s causing E)); (S’s causing (S’s causing (S’s causing
E))); and so on. And it is absurd to think that every time S freely
acts S literally performs an infinite number of acts. So if S
causes E, then agent causalism must be false.
The agent causalist can respond, however. One possibility
is to accept the infinite regress but insist that it is not vicious.
For example, imagine that you walk in a straight line from the
center of a room to one of the room’s walls, touching the wall.121
Call that action—your walking to the wall—“a”. Before you
complete a, you complete another action—walking halfway to
the wall. After you walk halfway but before you get all the way
to the wall, you complete a third action—walking three-quarters
of the way to the wall—and so on. In performing a quotidian
action such as a, you perform an infinite number of actions. But
this infinite regress is not vicious. If it were, then perhaps Zeno
of Elea would have succeeded in showing that, appearances
notwithstanding, you never get from point A to point B.122
(“Sure, every time I freely act I perform an infinite number of
actions. But so what? Every time I move from one place to
another I perform an infinite number of actions. Where’s the
problem?”)
Another possible response to the infinite regress objection
has been suggested by Timothy O’Connor. Call events such as
E123 causally complex events. Run-of-the-mill events that are not
themselves instantiations of causal relations, call them causally
simple events, lack the internal structure of causally complex
events. There are at least two types of causally complex
events—event-causal events and agent-causal events. Eventcausal events have the following structure: (E1’s causing E2),
where E1 and E2 are events (themselves either causally complex
or causally simple). Agent-causal events have the following
structure: (S’s causing E), where S is an agent and E is an event
(itself either causally complex or causally simple):
121. Assume for the sake of this example that space-time is continuous.
122. “That which is in locomotion must arrive at the half-way stage before
it arrives at the goal.” ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS VI: 9, 239b10 (recounting one of
Zeno’s paradoxes of motion).
123. Recall that E was (S’s causing e). As will very shortly be explained,
E is an example of an agent-causal event.
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[I]nstantiations of . . . (causally complex events)
are not themselves directly on the receiving end of
other causal relations—instead . . . (causally
simple . . . events) are. Causings are the
producings of events, rather than what are
produced (in the first instance). Compare an
ordinary case of an event-causal process
(consisting of event F’s causing event G) being
caused by some further event E. Surely this can
consist only in E’s causing F, the front-end
relatum of the complex event . . . . If this is right,
then an agent-causal event could not be caused for
the simple reason that the cause in this case is not
an event.124
To unpack and amplify O’Connor’s response: The objection’s
infinite regress gets going because it is assumed that any
causally complex event, understood as a whole, must be brought
about by something else, either another event or an agent. But
this assumption is false.
(1) – In the case of an event-causal event (F’s
causing G), nothing causes (F’s causing G) as a
whole—causal relations themselves never get
caused like that. Instead, an event E or an agent
A causes event F, the first component of the
complex whole (F’s causing G). And if F is caused
in either of those ways, everything is accounted
for—in particular, there are no uncaused events
leftover. For example, if E causes F and F causes
G, then we have as much of an explanation of (F’s
causing G) as there is to have.
(2) – In the case of an agent-causal event (S’s
causing e), nothing causes (S’s causing e) as a
whole—causal relations themselves never get
caused like that. Instead, the only possibilities
124. O’Connor, Why Agent Causation?, supra note 92, at 147.
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are that an event E or an agent A causes agent S,
the first component of the complex whole (S’s
causing e). But these prima facie possibilities are
not real, because S the agent is a substance and
therefore cannot be caused by anything. S’s
coming to exist (an event) can be caused; S’s
changing (an event) can be caused; and S’s ceasing
to exist (an event) can be caused; but S (the
substance itself) cannot be caused. Conceptually,
agents are not the sorts of things that can be
caused any more than touchdowns are the sorts of
things that can be scored in chess matches. So
everything requiring a causal explanation is
accounted for—in particular, there are no
uncaused events leftover.
Agent causalism
provides as much of an explanation of (S’s causing
e) as there is to have.
The critic might insist at this point that although eventcausal events are never caused as a whole, agent-causal events
are, indeed, must be, so caused. And because agent-causal
events, as wholes, require causal explanations, the infinite
regress is generated after all.125 But this appears to be an ad
hoc claim about causation. What motivates such a claim? Why
think that causation is radically discontinuous in that way? For
example, if the critic rejects agent causalism because of agent
causalism’s, allegedly, indefensible commitment to two
fundamentally different sorts of causation, then why would the
critic be satisfied emphasizing that there is a fundamental
difference between sorts of causally complex events—between
event-causal events and agent-causal events? What nonquestion-begging argument is available to the critic to defend
such a fundamental difference? No such argument seems to be
in the offing.
125. Id. (“[T]he claim is that events can directly bring about causal
relations when they relate an agent to an event, but not when they relate an
event to a further event.”). Perhaps another implication of the critic’s main
claim here is that agents can directly bring about causal relations when they
relate themselves to an event but not when they relate an event to a further
event. The response to the critic would proceed the same way, mutatis
mutandis.
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The second of the more engaging objections to agent
causalism that I shall consider tries to discredit agent
causalism’s ability to account for how agents can act for reasons
and how reasons can play an indispensable role in explaining
what agents do. In such reason-explanation accounts, “[a]n
agent acts for a certain reason . . . only if the agent’s recognizing
that reason causes, in an appropriate way, the agent’s behavior;
and citing a reason contributes to a (true) reason-explanation of
an action only if the agent’s recognizing that reason caused, in
an appropriate way, the action.”126 But the agent causalist
cannot think that an agent’s recognizing a reason alone is what
causes the agent’s free behavior, for the agent’s recognizing a
reason is an event, not a substance.127 Instead, the agent
causalist insists that the agent herself does at least some of the
causing. So the agent causalist cannot provide a reasonexplanation account in the usual way. Agent causalism is
therefore faced with a challenge: Since the power of an agent to
agent-cause events is reasons-responsive, agent causalism must
be able to account for how reason-explanations of an agent’s
behavior are possible. But the standard way to do this is
foreclosed to the agent causalist. So how can agent causalism
supply the requisite account?
To respond to this challenge, the agent causalist must
provide a plausible, non-standard account of reasonexplanations. In Part V, drawing heavily on the work of others,
I shall sketch such an account. My goal will not be to establish
dispositively that the account is true but to establish that the
account is plausible—that it might well be true. If the account
to come is at least plausible, then agent causalism survives the
second objection in that agent causalism remains plausible. I
turn now to the task of providing that account by examining the
anatomy of a voluntary act and situating a voluntary act within
the context of the commission of a crime.

126. Randolph Clarke & Justin Capes, Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic)
Theories of Free Will, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (rev ed.
2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/.
127. Id. (“Standard agent-causal views deny that events such as the
agent’s recognizing certain reasons cause any free action (or whatever event
the agent directly causes when she acts freely).”).
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The Anatomy of a Voluntary Act and a Voluntary Act as a
Part of a Crime

To return to the VAR: “[a] person is not guilty of an offense
unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a
voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is
physically capable.”128 In general, “if . . . the court can find a
voluntary act by the defendant, accompanied at that time by
whatever culpable mens rea that is required, which act in fact
proximately causes some legally prohibited state of affairs, then
the defendant is prima facie liable for that legal harm.”129
The VAR is an aspect of the broader actus reus requirement,
according to which there can be no criminal liability in the
absence of an actus reus—“[t]he wrongful deed that comprises
the physical components of a crime and that generally must be
coupled with mens rea to establish criminal liability.”130 To
connect the two legal requirements, “[t]he ‘voluntary act’
required for criminal liability is . . . to be understood as a bodily
movement, and an actus reus can be analyzed into a (set of)
bodily movements, and certain specified circumstances and
consequences.”131 Thus, for the actus reus requirement to be
satisfied, there must be, at the core of the actus reus, one or more
voluntary body movements, which bring about prohibited states
of affairs under specified circumstances. Oliver Wendell Holmes
described this core as “a voluntary muscular contraction, and
nothing else. The chain of physical sequences which it sets in
128. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (1962).
context of a drunk driving charge:

Along similar lines in the

Though movement of a vehicle is an essential element of the
statutory requirement, the mere movement of a vehicle does
not necessarily, in every circumstance, constitute a ‘driving’
of the vehicle . . . . If a vehicle is moved by some power beyond
the control of the driver, or by accident, it is not such an
affirmative or positive action on the part of the driver as will
constitute a driving of a vehicle within the meaning of the
statute.
State v. Taft, 102 S.E.2d 152, 154 (W. Va. 1958).
129. See MOORE, ACT AND CRIME, supra note 16, at 35–36.
130. Actus Reus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 37 (7th ed. 1999).
131. Duff, Acting, Trying, and Criminal Liability, supra note 8, at 81–82.
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motion or directs to the [resulting] harm is no part of it, and very
generally a long train of such sequences intervenes.”132 The
chain of consequences leads to or constitutes the state of affairs
that is prohibited.
For example, “[a] person is guilty of criminal homicide if he
purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death
of another human being.”133 Imagine that A purposely kills B by
shooting B. B’s being shot to death is the prohibited state of
affairs; A’s moving her trigger finger is the voluntary act that
causes the prohibited state of affairs; and the mens rea
requirement134 is satisfied because A purposely kills B—it was
A’s conscious objective to cause B’s death. A has committed
criminal homicide. As this example illustrates, the voluntary
act is A’s moving a part of her body, which kicks off a subsequent
causal chain leading to the prohibited outcome. John Austin
elaborates:
Most of the names which seem to be names of acts,
are names of acts, coupled with certain of their
consequences. For example, [i]f I kill you with a
gun or pistol, I shoot you: And the long train of
incidents which are denoted by that brief
expression, are considered . . . as if they
constituted an act, perpetrated by me. In truth,
the only parts of the train which are my act or
acts, are the muscular motions by which I raise
the weapon; point it at your head or body, and pull
the trigger. These I will. The contact of the flint
and steel; the ignition of the powder, the flight of
the ball towards your body, the wound and
subsequent death, with the numberless incidents
132. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 83-84 (Belknap
Press 2009) (1881) (discussing acts in a torts context).
133. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(1) (1962).
134. Note that the mens rea requirement corresponds to culpability, one
of the factors that can influence a criminal defendant’s desert according to
standard retributivist theories. The MPC defines the four main types of mens
rea—“purposely” (corresponding to purpose); “knowingly” (corresponding to
knowledge); “recklessly” (corresponding to recklessness); and “negligently”
(corresponding to criminal negligence). MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (titled
“General Requirements of Culpability.”).
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included in these, are consequences of the act
which I will. I will not those consequences,
although I may intend them.135
The only things that get willed in the passage above are
muscular body movements. Everything else is at most intended.
And the “names of acts” to which Austin refers correspond to
descriptions of what the agent does. Joel Feinberg suggests a
metaphor for these act-descriptions:
This well-known feature of our language, whereby
a man’s action can be described almost as
narrowly or as broadly as we please, might
fittingly be called the “accordion effect,” because
an action, like the folding musical instrument, can
be squeezed down to a minimum or else stretched
way out. He turned the key, he opened the door,
he startled Paul, he killed Paul—all of these
things we might say that Peter did with one
identical set of bodily movements.136
Thus, two things are true of Austin’s pistol-shooting finger
movement. First, it is a muscular movement that initiates a
causal chain; and second, it is the object, or part of the object, of
a set of descriptions exhibiting the accordion effect. In addition,
there are two other facts about the finger movement:
A. The movement is, or is part of,137 a basic
action.
B. The movement is voluntary.

135. JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF
POSITIVE LAW 427–28 (Robert Campbell ed., 4th ed., London: John Murrary,
Albemarle Street 1873) (emphasis removed).
136. Joel Feinberg, Action and Responsibility, in DOING AND DESERVING:
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 119, 134 (Princeton Univ. Press 1970)
[hereinafter Feinberg, Action and Responsibility].
137. See infra for an explanation that the bodily movement will be one
component of a basic action. It will not be identical to the basic action as a
whole.
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The Movement is a Basic Action

Actions can be divided into two kinds—basic and complex.
A complex action is performed by performing some other action.
For example, A prepares dinner by doing a number of other
things—slicing vegetables, turning on the oven, and so forth. So
preparing dinner is a complex action. In contrast, “B is a basic
action of a if and only if (i) B is an action and (ii) whenever a
performs B, there is no other action A performed by a such that
B is caused by A.”138 For example, me wiggling my toe is a basic
action because when I wiggle my toe there is nothing else that I
do that causes my toe to wiggle.
Douglas Lavin elaborates the notion of a basic action:
Basic action is a limit on [a] rational order of
means and ends. It can be described from either
side of the relation. Through the concept of an
end: a basic action is not the end of any other
action; nothing else is done in order to do it; it is
not an answer to “Why?” when asked about any
other action. And equally through the concept of
a means: no means are taken in the execution of a
basic action; it is not done by doing anything else;
there is no answer to “How?” when asked of it. I
illuminated the room by means of turning on the
light, turned on the light by flipping the switch,
and flipped the switch by moving my finger, but
maybe moving my finger is something I simply
did, something which did not involve taking any
steps or means, or again doing anything with a
view to moving my finger? If so, it is a basic
action: That X is doing/did A is basic just when
there is no A* such that X is doing/did A* in order
to do A; or again, That X is doing/did A is basic
138. Arthur Danto & Sidney Morgenbesser, What We Can Do, 60 J. PHIL.
435, 435 (1963). I would suggest a third condition that must also be satisfied:
(iii) whenever a performs B, there is no other action A performed by a such that
a knows that B’s occurring is causally necessary for (and precedes) A and a
performs A to assure B’s occurring.
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just when there is no A* such that X is doing/did
A by means of doing A*.139
If A raises her arm, then A performs a basic action because
there is nothing else that A does that causes her arm to rise. Of
course, in the normal type of arm-raising case events happen
before A’s arm rises that cause A’s arm to rise—bioelectrical
impulses travel along A’s arm-nerves and so forth—but these
events are not actions140 performed by A. Also, it is possible for
A’s raising her arm not to be a basic action. Imagine that A’s
arm is paralyzed but connected to a pulley system that, if
activated, will raise it. In such a case, A’s raising her arm by
activating the pulley system would be a complex action, not a
basic one.
B.

The Movement is Voluntary

In addition to being a basic action, the pistol-shooting finger
movement must be voluntary for the VAR to be satisfied.
Beyond the idea, discussed earlier, that voluntariness
guarantees a sort or degree of actor-control, what makes a body
139. Douglas Lavin, Must There Be Basic Action?, 47 NOÛS 273, 275
(2013) (emphasis added). Further:
That there are such things as simple [i.e., basic] acts should
be beyond controversy, partly because each person has direct
experience of them in his own case and partly because a
denial of their existence leads to an infinite regress and
attendant conceptual chaos. If, before we could do anything,
we had to do something else first as a means, then clearly we
could never get started. As one writer puts it, ‘If there are any
actions at all, there are basic actions.’
Feinberg, supra note 136, at 136 (quoting Arthur Danto, Basic Actions, 2 AM.
PHIL. Q. 141, 142 (1965)). But cf. Douglas Lavin, Must There Be Basic Action?,
47 NOÛS 273 (2013) (arguing that there might not be such things as basic
actions).
140. One could conceptualize A’s making her “arm-raising” arm-nerves
fire as an action in certain situations. For example, imagine that A knows that
a particular cluster of her arm-nerves fires and causes her arm muscles to
contract every time she raises her arm, and assume that A sets out to fire those
nerves by raising her arm. In such a case, A’s firing her arm-nerves would be
a complex action because condition (iii) (for basic actions) would not be
satisfied. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.

55

700

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36:3

movement a voluntary act in the sense of the VAR? The MPC
provides the beginning of an answer, since it clarifies that body
movements do not count as voluntary acts when they are “not a
product of the effort or determination of the actor, either
conscious or habitual.”141 The MPC also explicitly rules out
certain categories of body movements from being voluntary
actions, including reflex movements, unconscious movements,
and movements resulting from hypnotic suggestion.142
Reconsider the MPC’s positive characterization of voluntary
actions, such as simple body movements, as those resulting from
the “effort or determination” of the actor.143 The MPC comments
explain that bodily movements that result from an actor’s effort
or determination are to be understood as movements that result
from an unimpeded exercise of the actor’s will:
[The MPC] formulates a residual category of
involuntary movements, describing them as those
that “otherwise . . . [are] not a product of the effort
or determination of the actor, either conscious or
habitual.” The formulation seeks to express the
main content of the traditional idea of an
“external manifestation of the actor’s will”
. . . . In other respects the formulation . . . is
designed to make the requirement of an act a
minimal one.144
To flesh out the idea that a bodily movement is an “external
manifestation of the actor’s will,” I shall adopt the view that a
141. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2)(d) (AM. LAW. INST., Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1985).
142. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2)(a)–(c) (AM. LAW. INST., Official
Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
143. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2)(d) (AM. LAW. INST., Official Draft
and Revised Comments 1985).
144. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1985). Similarly, the VAR, “stated in its simplest form, is
that the ‘act’ of the accused, in the sense of a muscular movement, must be
willed. It must be a voluntary expression of the accused’s will. . . .” H.L.A.
HART, Acts of Will and Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY:
ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 90, 94–95 (2d ed. 2008) (quoting J. Ll. J.
Edwards, Automatism and Criminal Responsibility, 21 MOD. L. REV. 375, 380
(1958)).
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voluntary basic action is, at least in part, the causal result of the
actor’s preceding mental states—intentional mental states, in
particular. (Here, “intentional” means having the property of
intentionality (roughly, “aboutness”).)
The content of an
intentional mental state is often understood to be a proposition.
For example, Fred’s belief that his room is clean has
intentionality, and its content is the proposition that Fred’s room
is clean. If Fred has a phobia of clean rooms, then he might fear
that his room is clean. If so, then his fear has intentionality, and
its content is the same proposition—that Fred’s room is clean. If
Fred resolves to clean his room, forming the intention, or
volition,145 to do so, then his intention has intentionality, and
again, its content is the same proposition—that Fred’s room is
clean. Because they have propositions as their contents, mental
states such as beliefs, fears, and volitions are often referred to
as propositional attitudes.
When someone acts voluntarily, what different sorts of
intentional mental states or faculties are involved? The
following is a partial breakdown of voluntarily visiting a
neighbor:
[I]f someone desires to visit his neighbour and
believes that knocking on the neighbour’s door
will facilitate a visit, and hence forms the
intention to knock on the neighbour’s door, he is
thereby prepared to exercise his will—he then
tries to knock on the door, and with luck succeeds
in performing the intended action.146
Featured in this breakdown are: (1) belief, (2) desire, (3)
intention, and (4) will (the exercise of which is a “trying”).
Turning first to (1)–(3): An intention is more like a desire than a
belief in that desires and intentions are examples of what might
be termed pro-attitudes, whereas a belief is not a pro-attitude.
What does it take for a propositional attitude to be a proattitude? Not much. Pro-attitudes include “desires, wantings,
145. Although there is some dispute over the matter, I shall assume that
a volition is an intention, not a type of belief or desire.
146. COLIN MCGINN, THE CHARACTER OF MIND: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 131 (2d ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1982).
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urges, promptings, and a great variety of moral views, aesthetic
principles, economic prejudices, social conventions, and public
and private goals and values in so far as these can be interpreted
as attitudes of an agent directed toward actions of a certain
kind.”147 Indeed, pro-attitudes might include:
[N]ot only permanent character traits that show
themselves in a lifetime of behavior, like love of
children or a taste for loud company, but also the
most passing fancy that prompts a unique action,
like a sudden desire to touch a woman’s elbow. In
general, pro attitudes must not be taken for
convictions, however temporary, that every action
of a certain kind ought to be performed, is worth
performing, or is, all things considered, desirable.
On the contrary, a man may all his life have a yen,
say, to drink a can of paint, without ever, even at
the moment he yields, believing it would be worth
doing.148
In a nutshell, a pro-attitude is any propositional attitude
that favors the coming true of the proposition, that is, the
attitude’s content, and thereby can be connected causally to
some action of the agent who has the attitude. Beliefs are not
pro-attitudes even in this very broad sense, as they
characteristically represent a proposition neutrally, as already
being true.149
Pro-attitudes also have a characteristic direction of fit,
which differs from the direction of fit of a belief. “It is
characteristic of [beliefs] to represent the world as being a
certain way, and [a belief] can be judged correct or incorrect
according to whether the world is the way it is represented to be;
the role of [beliefs] is to fit the world.”150 A mis-fitting belief is
147. Donald Davidson, Actions, Reasons and Causes, 60 J. PHIL. 685, 686
(1963).
148. Id.
149. I am simplifying by glossing over issues that might be raised, for
example, by versions of moral internalism according to which believing certain
propositions is itself sufficient for some degree of motivation.
150. MCGINN, supra note 146, at 117.
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defective, and we call that defect being false. On the other hand:
[D]esires [and other pro-attitudes] are said to
have a “direction of fit” . . . that is the opposite to
the “direction of fit” of beliefs . . . . [B]eliefs are like
declarative sentences, which are satisfied (made
true) by whether the world as it is conforms to
them. But desires are like imperative sentences,
which are satisfied (fulfilled) by changes in the
world bringing the world into conformity with
them.151
Although both intentions and desires are pro-attitudes, they
are pro-attitudes of different types:
[S]uppose I desire a milk shake for lunch,
recognize that the occasion is here, and am guilty
of no irrationality. Still, I might not drink a milk
shake; for my desire for a milk shake still needs to
be weighed against conflicting desires—say, my
desire to lose weight. My desire for a milk shake
potentially influences what I do at lunchtime. But
in the normal course of events I still might not
even try to drink a milk shake.
In contrast, suppose that this morning I formed
the intention to have a milk shake at lunch,
lunchtime arrives, my intention remains, and
nothing unexpected happens. In such a case I do
not normally need yet again to tote up the pros
and cons concerning milk-shake drinking.
Rather, in the normal course of events I will
simply proceed to execute (or anyway, try to
execute) my intention and order a milk shake. My
intention will not merely influence my conduct, it
will control it.152
151. Tim Schroeder, Desire, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(rev. ed. 2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/desire/.
152. MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON 15–
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Thus, intentions are committed to action in a controlling,
executory way that desires are not. Desires can influence, but
“[a]s a conduct-controlling pro-attitude my intention involves a
special commitment to action that ordinary desires do not.”153
Having considered belief, desire, and intention in more
detail, we can now ask: How do the actor’s will and trying fit into
a case where someone voluntarily performs a basic action such
as raising her arm?
Colin McGinn offers the following
suggestion:
[I]ntention cannot be analysed in terms of desire
and/or belief, and willing cannot be reduced to
intending . . . . Desire is unfettered by knowledge
of what is practically possible, but intention needs
to reckon with the practical facts of life, as these
are seen by the agent. Intending is what channels
desire and belief toward the will; forming an
intention is like putting the active faculty into
gear, without yet depressing the accelerator. But
intending is not the same as willing. . . . [Y]ou can
intend to do what you do not, in the event, will to
do: you may intend to put a question to the
distinguished speaker, but lose your nerve (will)
at the last minute, though the intention may
survive. We can say . . . that to will something is
for the state of intending to be ‘activated’ . . . for
an intention to be activated is just for the agent to
try
to
do
what
he
intends
. . . . Without the will, then, intentions would
never get off the ground. So the transition from
. . . (desire and belief) to intention and thence to
trying is a transition to genuinely distinct mental
states or events, progressively closer, temporally
and conceptually, to bodily action.154
16 (Harvard Univ. Press 1999).
153. Id. at 16.
154. MCGINN, supra note 146, at 131-32. McGinn’s picture seems, in
principle, empirically falsifiable. If we learn enough about how the human
brain works (through scientific empirical investigation) such that it becomes
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Two points about the trying aspect of a basic voluntary
action deserve emphasis: (a) often, the trying is conscious to the
agent, and (b) the trying is part of, instead of being the cause of,
the basic action. Turning first to a trying being conscious, the
notion of an unconscious trying seems natural when the action
being attempted is a complex action:
[T]here are descriptions of what an agent is trying
to do that the agent is unaware of—as when a
psychoanalyst says that his patient, in losing a
photograph
of
his
father,
was
trying
unconsciously to get rid of his father. In such a
case, we are describing the agent’s trying in terms
of his reasons,155 and these can be unconscious.156
But often, when the action is a basic action, the agent is
conscious of trying to perform it. When A tries, in the normal
way, to raise her arm, A is often aware that she is trying to do
so. Of course, there are cases in which A tries to raise her arm
without being aware that she is trying, especially when A
successfully and almost effortlessly tries. For example, imagine
that someone asks A to raise her arm. A then tries to raise her
arm and succeeds. A is aware of the request and of complying
with the request. But A might not, in addition, be distinctly and
consciously aware of trying to comply with the request. To A, it
may seem as if she just effortlessly does what she was asked to
do. But even if in such a case A is not distinctly conscious of
trying, A is nonetheless trying—there is a trying going on in
addition to the arm movement. In other words, every basic
action includes a trying, even when the action is successful and
thereby draws the actor’s attention away from the trying part of
what she does.
implausible to think that a human brain could enter into functional states that
satisfy McGinn’s picture of how mental states cause voluntary actions, then
the accuracy of the picture would be called into serious question.
155. I would be inclined at this point in the passage to refer to unconscious
desires, instead of reasons, to explain (without evaluating) the agent’s
behavior.
156. MCGINN, supra note 146, at 128.
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As previously mentioned, the trying is also part of the basic
action—the trying does not cause the action. When A raises her
arm: (i) A tries to raise her arm, and (ii) it rises. Both the trying
and the movement are components of the action:
[T]he trying occurs, closely followed by the
movement, these being related . . . as cause and
effect; the [basic] action is . . . trying and
movement taken together. More precisely, the
action is . . . composed of both the trying and the
movement—or equivalently, is . . . identical with
a complex event having these constituents. Since
the action has these two items as constituent
components, it is neither caused by the trying nor
the cause of the movement—for causal relations
do not hold between events and their
constituents.157
In other words: The trying causes the arm to rise. But the
trying does not cause the basic action, and the basic action does
not cause the arm to rise. Instead, the trying and the arm’s
rising compose the basic action. All voluntary basic actions
include, without being caused by, a trying. At this point, most of
the main elements of the anatomy of a voluntary basic action
have been identified—belief, desire, volition, and trying
(willing). What remains is to insert the agent and then explain
how the account might accommodate the reasonsresponsiveness of agent-causation.158 But before doing this in
Part V.D, it is worth considering some of the advantages of
including a trying as a part of a voluntary basic action. These
advantages indirectly bolster the claim that there are plausible
versions of agent causalism.
C. Advantages to Understanding Voluntary Basic Actions to
Include Tryings

157. Id. at 126.
158. See supra Part IV.
Recall that accommodating reasonsresponsiveness was the challenge posed to agent causalism at the end of Part
IV.
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Adopting the position that a voluntary basic action always
includes, as a distinct element, an exercise of will (a trying) has
advantages. R.A. Duff poses a hypothetical and broaches a
question famously raised by Ludwig Wittgenstein.159 First, the
hypothetical:
Whether I move my arm depends on conditions
outside my control: if those conditions are not
satisfied (if my arm is paralyzed . . .), I might fail
to move my arm, although . . . I try to move it. I
might even believe that I have moved my arm
when it has not actually moved: this happens
when someone’s arm has been anaesthetized, he
is asked to shut his eyes and raise his arm, and
the arm is held down. This person has not been
merely inactive.160
Wittgenstein’s famous question was: “[W]hen ‘I raise my
arm,’ my arm goes up.
And the problem arises: what
is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes
up from that fact that . . . I raise my arm?”161
How do we explain the active nature of the person with the
anaesthetized arm? And is there a way to answer Wittgenstein’s
question that is related to how we explain that person’s active
nature? One straightforward way to do this is to say that the
person was trying to raise his arm (trying to perform a basic
action) and that what is left over when I subtract the fact that
my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm is my trying
to raise my arm.
159. Duff ultimately argues against the idea that every basic action
includes a distinctive trying. See Duff, Acting, Trying, and Criminal Liability,
supra note 8, at 75.
160. Id. at 83-84. One could modify the hypothetical so that the arm is
not being held down and that the individual, without realizing it, has been
administered a temporary arm paralytic. Or maybe the anesthetic doubles as
a paralytic, but the individual does not realize that. Even in such a modified
case, the individual is not merely inactive in the sense under consideration
here.
161. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS para. 621 (G.
E. M. Anscombe trans., Basil Blackwell 1963).
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In Duff’s example of the person who tries to raise his arm
but fails, without realizing it, there is no basic action because
there is no arm movement. In the normal arm-raising case,
there is the trying and the arm movement. The trying causes
the arm movement. And the voluntary basic action comprises
the trying causing the arm movement. In the abnormal case of
the man with the anesthetized arm, there is no basic action
because only the trying happens—the arm movement part is
missing because something interferes with the causal link
between the trying and the arm.
Consistent with Part V.B’s brief discussion of trying, and
limiting our attention for the moment to basic actions, the
following picture emerges:
[A]ll [basic] actions . . . involve trying . . . . Trying
is inherently active, and . . . [is] the psychological
aspect of action. We do not, of course, always say
of someone who acts that he tried to do that which
he did . . . . But this does not imply that it is false
to claim that agents try to perform even their most
effortless actions . . . . [T]here seems no difference,
with respect to what is going on in you
psychologically, between the normal case in which
your arm rises as a result of your decision to raise
it and the abnormal case in which, unknown to
you, your arm has been paralyzed; yet in the latter
case we would say that you did at least try to raise
your arm—and your mental acts were no different
in the former case . . . . [S]o we can legitimately
claim that there is always an event of trying
involved in any [even basic] action.162
Adopting the view that tryings are distinct elements of
every voluntary basic action also helps explain certain types of
voluntary omissions. Sometimes omissions have an agentcontrolled, voluntary nature. “[A] guardsman who keeps himself
from moving acts, but acts precisely by not moving his body.”163
162. MCGINN, supra note 146, at 123-24.
163. Duff, Acting, Trying and Criminal Liability, supra note 8, at 83.
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The active, voluntary nature of the guardsman is captured by
the idea that he is, successfully, trying to keep his body still—
trying to not-move his body. Tryings serve not just as the
psychologically active components of voluntary actions but also
as the psychologically active components of voluntary
omissions.164 As explained, in the case of a voluntary armraising, the trying and the arm’s rising are two components of
the basic action, and the trying causes the arm movement. In
the case of a voluntary non-raising of an arm, the trying and the
arm’s not rising are two components of the voluntary omission,
and the trying causes the arm’s not rising. (Contrast this last
case with the previous case of the anesthetized arm that does
not rise. In the anesthetized arm case where the actor is trying
to raise his arm, there is the trying and the arm’s not-rising. But
there, the trying does not cause the arm’s not-rising. Instead,
the causal explanation of the arm’s not-rising is that the
anesthesia/paralytic interferes with the usual causal connection
between what the actor tries to do with his arm and how his arm
behaves. So in the anesthetized arm case, there is an omission
(to raise the arm), but the omission is not voluntary.)
Adding tryings to the picture—distinct from beliefs, desires,
and volitions—also helps with what might be referred to as the
problem of wayward causal chains. Donald Davidson raised this
problem against the backdrop of a theory according to which it
is an agent’s belief/desire pair that proximately causes body
movements when she intentionally acts. Davidson noted that,
even if a belief/desire pair represents and causes a simple
muscular movement, there is no guarantee that what happens
is a voluntary, intentional action:
Beliefs and desires that would rationalize an
action if they caused it in the right way . . . may
cause it in other ways. If so, the action was not
performed with the intention that we could have
read off from the attitudes that caused it . . . . A
164. This is not to suggest that an omission must be voluntary (include a
trying) for the VAR to be satisfied. For example, if the requisite mens rea is
(criminal) negligence and the actus reus is defined in terms of an omission,
then the VAR might be satisfied even if the defendant does not actively try to
omit.
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climber might want to rid himself of the weight
and danger of holding another man on a rope, and
he might know that by loosening his hold on the
rope he could rid himself of the weight and
danger. This belief and want might so unnerve
him as to cause him to loosen his hold, and yet it
might be the case that he never chose to loosen his
hold, nor did he do it intentionally.165
Arguably, the VAR might not be satisfied if criminal charges
were brought against the climber for the death of his climbing
partner.166 Granted, his grip-loosening was not an entirely
mindless reflex, an unconscious movement, or the result of
hypnotic suggestion. But something was not voluntary about
what the climber did. An official comment to the MPC
emphasizes that “[t]here is sufficient difference between
ordinary human activity and a reflex or a convulsion to make it
desirable that they be distinguished for purposes of criminal
responsibility by a term like ‘voluntary.’”167 Voluntary actions
are supposed to be instances of “ordinary human activity.” To
assure that we have a genuine case of “ordinary human activity,”
we should stipulate that the belief/desire pair causes the
muscular movement in the “right way”168 and not via a wayward
causal chain.
But what is the “right way?” Once we introduce tryings, it
becomes natural to say that the VAR is not satisfied in the
mountain-climber case because the climber never tried to let go.
Causal chains are prevented from becoming wayward by having
tryings situated within them. Of course, this raises another

165. Donald Davidson, Freedom to Act, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS
63, 79 (2d ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1980).
166. I do not mean to suggest that criminal charges would be brought in
a case like this.
167. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1985).
168. See Bishop, supra note 108, at 61.
Obviously, a defensible
specification of what counts as the “right way” is necessary to solve the
“wayward causal chain” problem and clarify exactly what makes for a
voluntary act. See also id. at 61-79 for an argument that the most promising
strategy for solving the problem of wayward causal chains is to adopt agent
causalism.
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question. How are tryings situated within causal chains to solve
the problem of wayward causal chains and assure that the VAR
is satisfied? To answer this question, I turn now to completing
the sketch of the anatomy of a voluntary action. Doing this will
suggest how tryings might solve the problem of wayward causal
chains, and it will also suggest an answer to the remaining open
question from Part IV: How might agent-causation be reasonsresponsive?
D. How Agent-Causation Might be Reasons-Responsive
How can we fit agents into our developing picture of
voluntary actions to make agent-causation responsive to
reasons? To answer this question, perhaps a good way to begin
is to reflect on what it is like to make an everyday decision
voluntarily to act on the basis of conscious deliberation—on the
basis of practical reasoning:
When I decide . . . to go for a walk on a cool autumn
evening, I am conscious of various factors at work
. . . motivating me either to do so or to do
something else instead. And there are some
courses of action which, while it is conceivable
that I might choose to follow
them
. . . do not represent ‘genuine’ possibilities for me
at that time, given my current mood, particular
desires and beliefs, and, in some cases, longstanding intentions of a general sort. But within
the framework of possibilities . . . that these . . .
conative and cognitive factors set, it seems . . . to
be up to me to decide which particular action I will
undertake. The decision I make is no mere vector
sum of internal and external forces acting upon
me during the process of deliberation . . . . Rather,
I bring it about—directly, you might say—in
response to the various considerations: I am the
source of my own activity, not merely in a relative
sense as the most proximate and salient locus of
an unbroken chain of causal transactions leading
up to this event, but fundamentally, in a way not
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prefigured by what has gone before.169
This passage partially describes what it is like to decide to
voluntarily go for a walk as the result of deliberation—as the
result of practical reasoning. And it mentions a causal role that
the agent herself plays in making that decision. Further, the
ultimate output of the agent’s deliberation is a physical action
that the agent performs—going for a walk. An ancient question
is impressed upon us when we consider that physical actions are
the ultimate outputs of episodes of practical reasoning:
[H]ow is it that thought . . . is sometimes followed
by action, sometimes not; sometimes by
movement, sometimes not? What happens seems
parallel to the case of thinking and inferring about
the immovable objects of science. There the end is
the truth seen (for, when one conceives the two
premisses,
one
at
once
conceives
and
comprehends the conclusion), but here the two
premisses result in a conclusion which is an
action—for example, one conceives that every
man ought to walk, one is a man oneself:
straightway one walks; or that, in this case, no
man should walk, one is a man: straightway one
remains at rest.170
This ancient question about practical reasoning arises
largely because, in paradigmatic cases, practical reasoning’s
inputs are psychological and logical, but its outputs are
strikingly different—they are muscular actions.
Practical reasoning is often distinguished from theoretical
reasoning. Theoretical reasoning might be considered less
mysterious than practical reasoning because its outputs do not
differ as dramatically from its inputs. Both the inputs and the
outputs are beliefs in cases of theoretical reasoning, which
proceeds in the form of theoretical inferences. It is important to
169. O’Connor, Agent Causation, supra note 113, at 173.
170. ARISTOTLE, ON THE MOTION OF ANIMALS 1 (A. S. L. Farquharson
trans., Infomotions, Inc. 2001).
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distinguish: (a) drawing a theoretical inference and (b) a
theoretical argument. Making an inference is psychological as
well as logical. Drawing an inference is something that someone
does; it is a psychological action. A theoretical argument, in
contrast, is a set of propositions, some of which are premises and
one of which is the conclusion. The relations between the
propositions are not psychological; they are logical, or evidential.
An argument is not something that someone does. Of course,
making an argument is something that someone does; it is a
communicative act. Also, when an argument is proffered and
understood, there can be psychological effects, for example, the
audience becomes convinced that the argument’s conclusion is
true.
Drawing a theoretical inference begins with the reasoner’s
believing that an argument’s premises, at least, considered
individually, are true. The causal upshot is the reasoner’s
coming to believe that the argument’s conclusion is true. In
theoretical inferences, the connection between the input and
output beliefs is forged by the reasoner’s grasp of the logical or
evidential relationship between the premises and conclusion. To
take a simple example, consider the following deductive
syllogism:
(1) All tortoises are mortal.
(2) Socrates is a tortoise.
Therefore, (3) Socrates is mortal.
Imagine that the reasoner believes that (1) and (2) are true.
John Bishop has suggested the following:
When I infer that Socrates is mortal from my
beliefs that Socrates is a tortoise and all tortoises
are mortal, I do something. It is clear that, when
I make the inference, it is not the case that my
believing that Socrates is a tortoise and my
believing that all tortoises are mortal are jointly
causally sufficient for my believing that Socrates
is mortal. When I make this inference, I consider
the content of these two beliefs of mine, recognize
their mutual relevance, and reason it out that
Socrates is mortal. This is not a very difficult
task, yet it is conceivable that I should not carry
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it out. I might fail to grasp the validity of the form
of argument I need to use, or, more likely, though
I do believe that Socrates is a tortoise and that
tortoises are mortal it happens that I never
connect the two: the tortoisehood of Socrates and
the mortality of tortoises never come together in
the same train of thought. Now, in this case,
though we refuse to allow that my holding the
premiss beliefs itself suffices causally for the
formation of the conclusion belief, we do not deny
that the premiss beliefs play some causal role.
They are intrinsic to the inference which brings
about the new belief. It is the agent who makes
the inference, and so that agent who causes his
belief, but he does so only in virtue of holding the
premiss beliefs to be true.171
This passage suggests that, even in the case of coming to
believe that Socrates is mortal by drawing a theoretical
inference, the agent causes something. The agent causes her
own coming-to-believe the conclusion; the agent herself causes
an event. In other words, it seems that agent-causation might
play a role not only in voluntary action, but also as a part of
theoretical reasoning. Of course, the agent’s premise-beliefs also
play a crucial causal, and logical, role. We have a picture in
which the agent herself is inserted as a causal factor, along and
in concert with her intentional mental states. And the agent is
exercising her agent-causal power, to draw an inference, in a
reasons-responsive manner. In combination, the fact that all
tortoises are mortal and the fact that Socrates is a tortoise are
reasons to believe that Socrates is mortal. And when the agent
draws the theoretical inference, she is responding to those
reasons.
Even if agent-causation is operative in theoretical reasoning
as well as in voluntary action, there is a certain degree of control
that seems lacking in connection with reasoning, at least in
comparison to one’s control over one’s basic muscular actions.
Granted, I do seem to have control over the trying aspects of
171. Bishop, supra note 108, at 77-78.
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performing mental actions, like drawing an inference. It is up
to me how hard I try, on a given occasion, to recognize logical or
conceptual relationships. But, I routinely seem to lack control
over what I come to believe as a result of such efforts. (Contrast:
I do not routinely lack control over where my arm goes as a result
of trying to raise it.)
For example, imagine that I try to follow a proof of the
Pythagorean Theorem and succeed. I see that the requisite
logical and conceptual relationships hold between the proof’s
premises and conclusion, and I see that the premises are
undoubtedly true. As a result, I come to believe the Pythagorean
Theorem. But now I am, so to speak, stuck with the new belief
whether I like it or not. Having drawn the inference, I now
cannot help myself epistemologically. Unless my memory fades,
I cannot rid myself of that new belief, no matter how badly I
might wish that the Pythagorean Theorem were false.
Empirical beliefs are also often involuntary in roughly this
sense. I believe that there is a keyboard on which I am typing
right now. Of course, I could contemplate bizarre falsifying
hypotheses in an effort to call that belief into doubt. Maybe I am
having a vivid dream and am in fact abed, far away from any
keyboards. But this, at most, reduces my certitude a little. I
just cannot get myself to not believe that I am typing on a
keyboard now.
Bracketing this seeming difference between our control over
our beliefs and our control over our voluntary basic muscular
actions, Bishop’s sketch of how reasons-responsive agentcausation is operative in theoretical reasoning suggests how
such causation might fit into practical reasoning leading
ultimately to voluntary action. Someone might understand a
practical inference as having beliefs as inputs and an intention
as an output. To take a simple example, imagine that A
promises B that she will meet B at the bus station at 3:00 PM.
Consider the following series of propositions:
(1) A promised B that she will meet B at the bus station at
3:00 PM.
(2) A should keep her promises.
(3) To get to the bus station by 3:00 PM, the only means
available to A is to ride her bicycle.
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(4) A rides her bicycle to the bus station.
How might A’s drawing a practical inference work in this
case? A believes (1), (2), and (3). That is, A has three beliefs,
whose propositional contents are (1), (2), and (3), respectively. A
recognizes that (1), (2), and (3), considered together, are
practical reasons that count in favor of riding her bicycle to the
bus station. A reasons it out and forms the intention to ride her
bicycle to the bus station—A forms an intention whose
propositional content is (4). This is not a very difficult task, yet
it is conceivable that A not carry it out. A might fail to grasp the
mutual relevance of the practical reasons. She might believe
that she made the promise, believe that she should keep her
promises, and believe that her only chance to get to the bus
station by 3:00 PM is to ride her bicycle. But she might never
connect the three in a unified train of thought. Although A’s
holding the premise-beliefs does not itself suffice causally for the
formation of the intention to ride her bicycle to the bus station,
the premise-beliefs play a causal role. They are intrinsic to the
inference that brings about the intention. It is the agent who
makes the inference, and so that agent who causes her intention,
but she does so only in virtue of holding the premise-beliefs to be
true.
Thus, reasons-responsive agent-causation can play an
indispensable role in the formation of intentions (volitions). But
this does not get us all the way to voluntary action, because “you
can intend to do what you do not, in the event, will to do.”172
“Intending is what channels desire and belief toward the will;
forming an intention is like putting the active faculty into gear,
without yet depressing the accelerator.”173 To get all the way to
voluntary action, the agent must do one more thing—depress the
accelerator. In other words, the agent must try. And, as
discussed previously, when the agent tries, she agent-causes the
trying. Further, if the trying causes a bodily movement, then
the agent also voluntarily agent-causes a basic action, composed
of the trying and the bodily movement. And when the agent
voluntarily performs the complex action of riding her bicycle to
the bus station, she does so by voluntarily performing numerous

172. MCGINN, supra note 146, at 132.
173. Id.
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basic actions.
The preceding paints a picture of voluntary action that the
actor performs on the basis of practical reasoning. According to
this picture, agent-causation is indispensable. First, agentcausation comes into play in the actor’s reasons-responsive
formation of a volition. Without the volition, there is no
voluntary act. So the reasons-responsive agent-causation is
essential to the provenance of the voluntary act. Second,
because the volition, standing alone, is insufficient to cause the
voluntary action, agent-causation kicks in a second time. The
agent exercises her will—she tries. If the trying successfully
causes the intended muscular movement, then the agent
voluntarily acts—the voluntary basic act consists of the trying
and the muscular movement. And all voluntary actions are
either basic or they are done by performing basic muscular
actions. This is how agent-causation ultimately leading to
voluntary action might be reasons-responsive.174
This picture also suggests how tryings might solve the
problem of wayward causal chains. The trying that solves the
problem of wayward causal chains fits in after the formation of
the intention. An agent’s beliefs, desires, fears, etc. may
influence what she does, even after she forms the intention. But
the intention, being executory, puts the agent’s will into gear, so
to speak. And once that happens, it is up to the agent to exercise
her will, (i.e., to agent-cause a trying). The intention does not
deterministically event-cause the agent to exercise her will (i.e.,
the intention is not causally sufficient for her to try). When a
trying is situated between the agent’s mental states and her
action in this way, the link between the mental states and the
action is not wayward, and the action is voluntary.
VI. Agent-Causal Retributivism and Justifying Applications of
the VAR
As this paper has argued, for retributivist justifications of
the VAR to be plausible, agent causalism must be true. Parts IV

174. Thus, the challenge posed by the second objection to agent causalism
at the end of Part IV has been met (at least, well enough that agent causalism
emerges as plausible).
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and V have been dedicated largely to making agent causalism
plausible. But many think that agent causalism is false. And if
it is false, then this paper’s main thesis implies that
retributivism cannot contribute to justifying the VAR—the
fundamental predicate of legal criminal liability.
Before
concluding, it is worth considering whether retributivism would
have difficulty justifying the VAR even if agent causalism were
true. To do this, it is helpful to consider three kinds of cases
recently discussed by Gideon Yaffe.
Yaffe has argued that the VAR is justified because it assures
that what he terms the “Requirement of Correspondence” is
satisfied when criminal liability is imposed upon a defendant:
When a defendant is shown to be guilty of a crime,
he is shown to have performed certain acts with
certain results in certain circumstances . . . . And
he is shown to have been in certain mental states
. . . . But . . . there is an additional requirement
that is so rarely at issue as to go unmentioned
most of the time: the defendant’s actions must
correspond with his mental states.175
In brief, the Requirement of Correspondence is that the
defendant’s mens rea and actus reus must correspond in the
right way for the state to impose legal punishment. And the
VAR guarantees that this requirement is satisfied:
Voluntary acts matter to criminal liability . . .
because without them we lack the link between
objectionable mental states and objectionable acts
that is required to be justified in punishing for the
package of mental states and conduct that crimes
. . . consist in. There is mens rea and there is actus
reus; but without a voluntary act, there is not the
link between the two that is required for desert of
punishment for the conjunction.176

175. Yaffe, supra note 2, at 183.
176. Id. at 184.
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Yaffe refers to this way of substantiating the VAR as the
“Manifestation of Mens Rea Rationale”:
Under [this rationale], the VAR is a byproduct of
the idea that mens rea is an essential part of
criminal liability. It is because we already think
that people should not be punished in the absence
of a showing of mens rea . . . that we are barred,
for moral reasons, from punishing them in the
absence of a voluntary act. Mens rea is essential,
but it isn’t relevant unless it’s manifested. And it
isn’t manifested unless there’s a voluntary act. To
punish . . . in the absence of a voluntary act is
morally no different from punishing in the
absence of mens rea, and that is unacceptable.177
And Yaffe argues that the Manifestation of Mens Rea
Rationale squares with three types of cases in which the VAR
plays a decisive role.
A.

Cases Featuring Complex Unconscious Bodily Movements

In the first type of case, there is no criminal liability because
unconscious178 bodily movements do not count as voluntary acts
for the purposes of the VAR. As one court has clarified, “[t]o
constitute a defense, unconsciousness need not rise to the level
of coma or inability to walk or perform manual movements.”179
A striking example is provided by a leading Canadian case, R. v.
Parks.180 In Parks, the defendant drove his car about twentythree kilometers from his residence to his in-laws’ home.181 He
then attacked his in-laws while they were asleep, killing one of
them.182 Afterward, he drove his car to a nearby police station,
177. Id.
178. Some might distinguish “unconscious” mental states from
“subconscious” mental states. This paper attempts no such distinction.
Hereafter, I shall use only the term “unconscious.”
179. People v. Halverson, 165 P.3d 512, 539 (Cal. 2007).
180. R. v. Parks, 2 S.C.R. 871 (Can. 1992).
181. Id. at 871.
182. Id.
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telling the police what he had done.183 The defendant was
acquitted.184 He successfully argued that because he was
sleepwalking through the entire incident, he should not be
subject to criminal liability.185 On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Canada determined that the defendant indeed should have been
acquitted because the record indicated that he was in a state of
“non-insane automatism” during the incident:
Automatism, although spoken of as a “defen[s]e”,
is conceptually a sub-set of the voluntariness
requirement, which in turn is part of the actus
reus component of criminal liability.
An
involuntary act, including one committed in an
automatistic condition entitles an accused to an
unqualified acquittal, unless the automatistic
condition stems from a disease of the mind
that has rendered the accused insane.186
The court added:
[Canada’s] system of justice is predicated on the
notion that only those who act voluntarily should
be punished under the criminal law. Here, no
compelling policy factors preclude a finding that
the accused’s condition was one of non-insane
automatism.187
How might an agent-causal, retributivist justification of the
VAR handle such cases? In the paradigmatic agent-causal
situation outlined above: (i) the agent forms a volition; (ii) the
volition enables the agent’s will to become active; (iii) the agent

183. Id.
184. Id. at 872.
185. Id. at 871-82.
186. Parks, 2 S.C.R. at 872.
187. Id. at 874. Cf. Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183, 193 (1879)
(granting the defendant a new trial because he had not been allowed to prove
that he suffered from somnambulism) (“Our law only punishes for overt acts
done by responsible moral agents. If the prisoner was unconscious when he
killed the deceased, he cannot be punished for that act . . . .”).
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exercises her will—she tries; and (iv) assuming that her trying
causes her body to move, she herself thereby causes an action.
When (i)–(iv) happen, a defendant exercises the requisite
control, which, in combination with the mens rea and the
remainder of the actus reus being satisfied, makes her deserving
of legal punishment.
The agent-causal retributivist justification of the VAR
would account for cases where the defendant acts unconsciously
if it turned out that in such cases the defendant lacked the
control requisite for desert. Assuming that he was unconscious
the entire time, did Parks lack that sort of control when he killed
one of his in-laws? The agent causalist might argue that Parks
lacked the requisite control because he did not, in the technical
sense of the agent-causal picture outlined in Part V, try to do any
of the things that he unconsciously did during his sleepwalking
episode. This argument relies on the following principle:
(P) The trying element of agent-causal voluntary
action is missing in any case in which a defendant
is unconscious of what she is doing.
Initially, this agent-causal explanation may seem very
counterintuitive. (Surely, for example, Parks tried to drive to
his in-laws’ home. If he did not even try, how could he have
managed to arrive there by car?) It is important to note,
however, that (P) uses the term trying in a technical sense. As
elaborated previously: a trying is a mental event distinct from
other types of states such as beliefs, desires, fears, and volitions;
a trying plays a particular functional role in the context of a
normal voluntary action; a trying is an event that is agentcaused; a trying is a component of, but not the cause of, a basic
action; and so forth. If we lose sight of this, then of course it may
seem absurd to say that Parks did not even try to drive to his inlaws’ home.
But with the technical meaning of trying firmly in mind, is
(P) plausible? The issue here is not whether the trying itself is
conscious. As previously explained, sometimes an actor is not
distinctly conscious of trying to do X but instead is conscious only
of doing X. (The previous example involved someone raising her
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arm upon request.)188 But as also explained, in such cases the
actor is still trying to do X. (The actor was still trying to raise
her arm.) But what if the actor is unconscious of doing X? (P)
does not imply merely that the agent is also not conscious of
trying to do X. According to (P), in such a case there is no trying
for the agent to be conscious of.
If (P) is true—if there is no trying in cases, such as Parks,
involving complex unconscious bodily movements—then how
can the complexity of the bodily movements be accounted for?
What Parks did was fairly elaborate. He got into his car; turned
on the ignition; drove about twenty-three kilometers to a
destination where two people he knew personally were located;
and so on. That sort of behavior evinces rationality. The agent
causalist could account for the complexity the same way an
event causalist might. For example, Yaffe describes the conduct
of Huey Newton, who defended himself in court by arguing that
he was unconscious when he fatally shot a police officer:189
Newton’s finger movements on the trigger were
not likely to be purely reflexive; they were clearly
goal directed. Newton seems to have been aiming
the gun at the officer, and so must have been
mentally representing a particular goal, namely
to shoot the officer, a mental representation that
was involved in guiding his bodily movements.190
To explain what Newton did, we need to treat him as an
intentional system. An intentional system is “a system whose
behavior can be (at least sometimes) explained and predicted by
relying on ascriptions to the system of beliefs and desires (and
hopes, fears, intentions, hunches . . . .).”191 Intentional states,
beliefs, desires, volitions, etc., play crucial roles in explaining
how intentional systems behave. An agent causalist can avail
herself of such states just as an event causalist can. An agent
causalist could consistently hold that intentional states operate

188.
189.
190.
191.
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Yaffe, supra note 2, at 176.
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deterministically in cases of complex unconscious behavior. In
such cases, the agent herself is causally inert because she is
asleep. But her rich, variegated, causally-complex economy of
unconscious intentional states is not inert. Because the agent
herself is inert, she lacks the control requisite for desert. In this
way, an agent causalist retributive justification of the VAR could
be consistent with not imposing criminal liability for complex
unconscious conduct.
B.

Cases Featuring Certain Omissions

In the second type of case, there is criminal liability even
though there is no voluntary act because the defendant is guilty
of a certain sort of omission. Certain omissions are equivalent
to voluntary acts for the purposes of the VAR. A good example
is provided by People v. Manon.192 In Manon, the defendant’s
appeal from a conviction for criminally negligent homicide and
endangering the welfare of a child was denied.193 Her infant son
had died due to neglect.194
The court emphasized that
“[c]riminal liability may . . . be based upon an omission, if such
omission is the failure to perform a legally imposed duty such as
parents’ nondelegable affirmative duty to provide their children
with adequate medical care.”195
How might an agent-causal retributivist justification of the
VAR handle such cases? When a crime’s actus reus features an
omission, there are two main possibilities depending on what
sort of mens rea is required for the crime. If the requisite mens
rea is purpose, then the agent causalist might insist that the
actus reus’s omission, a state of affairs, be caused by the agent
via a trying, as elaborated previously. Recall the case of the
guardsman who actively refrains from moving.196 In that case,
the guardsman agent-caused his not-moving. If that sort of

192. People v. Manon, 640 N.Y.S.2d 318 (App. Div. 1996), leave to appeal
denied, 673 N.E.2d 1248 (N.Y. 1996).
193. Id.
194. See id. at 319.
195. Id. at 320 (quoting People v. Steinberg, 595 N.E.2d 845, 847 (N.Y.
1992)).
196. See supra p. 166.
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omission were a crime,197 then perhaps the most natural mens
rea would be purpose. The guardsman would be guilty of this
crime because he purposely not-moved. In general, if a penal
code defined crimes in terms of purposeful omissions, then the
agent-causal retributivist would have no problem defending the
VAR, which would be interpreted as requiring a trying before
criminal liability was imposed. Only when the defendant tried
to omit would she exercise the control necessary for moral
responsibility, and therefore for desert, as least as to crimes of
omission requiring that type of mens rea.
But if the mens rea of a crime of omission were knowledge,
recklessness, or criminal negligence or if the crime of omission
were a strict liability crime, then the defendant’s trying would
presumably no longer need to be the cause of the omission. Take,
for example, the penal statutes that Cindy Manon violated when
she neglected her infant son:
A person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide
when, with criminal negligence, he causes the
death of another person. N.Y.198
A person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a
child when . . . . Being a parent . . . he or she fails
. . . to exercise reasonable diligence in the control
of such child to prevent him or her from becoming
. . . a “neglected child” . . . . 199
Section 125.10 required only criminal negligence for guilt.200
And because Manon was a parent, § 260.10 did not require that
she have any particular mens rea, beyond that possibly
suggested by “reasonable diligence,” to be guilty.201 Manon was
the victim’s parent, and she had at least two legal duties toward
her son—a duty to not negligently cause his death202 and a duty
197. Of course, it is farfetched to think that such an omission would ever
actually be a crime.
198. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 (McKinney 2016).
199. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10.
200. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10.
201. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10.
202. Manon’s having this particular duty did not depend on her being the
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to exercise reasonable diligence to prevent him from being
neglected. Manon flouted both duties. And her flouting them
had nothing in particular to do with her exercise of an agentcausal ability to cause crucial omissions. So how might an
agent-causal retributivist justify the law’s position that the VAR
is satisfied in such cases?
To see how, first consider Yaffe’s explanation of how the
Manifestation of Mens Rea Rationale addresses such omissions:
[W]hat we do not do often manifests our
objectionable mental states just as much as what
we do do even if there is no volition present. The
mental state of disregarding one’s child’s welfare
is manifested by the failure to do that which the
child’s welfare requires that one do. However, in
such cases, there need be no volition to serve as
causal intermediary between the morally and
criminally relevant mental state— . . . the state of
“disregard”—and the failure to do as one ought.
While that failure may need to be caused by the
prior mental state for the failure to manifest itself
in the morally relevant way, such causation does
not require volitional intermediaries.203
The mental state featured in Yaffe’s account is a “state of
disregard.”204 (We can put knowledge and recklessness aside for
the moment, since disregarding one’s child does not require
knowledge or recklessness.)
Thus, Yaffe seems to treat
negligence, or perhaps even strict liability, as a type of mental
state—it seems that disregarding negligently, or disregarding,
period, is supposed to count as being in a type of mental state.
This seems reasonable, since negligence and strict liability can
be considered culpability (“mens rea”) states, and “mens rea”
translates to “guilty mind.”205
But unlike recklessness,
knowledge, or purpose, which require conscious psychological
states, negligence and strict liability do not:
parent of the victim.
203. Yaffe, supra note 2, at 187–88.
204. Id.
205. Mens Rea, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 999 (7th ed. 1999).
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Properly understood, the principal mental state
concepts do not reflect a single hierarchy of legal
significance. Rather, they conceal two distinct
mental state hierarchies, of desire and belief, as
well as a third category, of conduct, which does not
essentially involve mental states. . . . Culpable
conduct includes . . . gross negligence.206
In other words, negligence and strict liability are types of
mens rea, but they are not types of mental, in the sense of
psychological, states. For example, the objective, counterfactual
nature of the MPC’s definition of negligence reinforces that
negligence is not a mental state:
A person acts negligently with respect to a
material element of an offense when he should be
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the material element exists or will result from his
conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and
degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it,
considering the nature and purpose of his conduct
and the circumstances known to him, involves a
gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would observe in the actor’s
situation.207
Mental, psychological, states are at most indirectly involved
or implied—the purpose of the defendant’s conduct and the
defendant’s knowledge of surrounding circumstances. But these
serve only to elaborate aspects of a hypothetical situation that a
reasonable person is placed in. Regardless of a defendant’s
actual psychological states, she is negligent when she fails to do
what a reasonable person would do. And a standard definition
of a strict liability crime reinforces that strict liability is not a
206. Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463,
464 (1992). Simons also explicitly counts strict liability as a “Conduct” state
that is “not a true mental state.” Id. at 465 tbl. 2.
207. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985).
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mental state either: “A crime that does not require a mens rea
element.”208 Here, strict liability is not even a sort of mens rea
that does not require any psychological states.
The Manifestation of Mens Rea Rationale can handle
negligence and strict-liability omissions because the mens rea
might still cause the omission and thereby become manifest in
the omission. But the causing and the manifestation would have
nothing in particular to do with the defendant’s actual
psychology or the bearing that her psychology had, if any, on her
control or moral responsibility. A state of negligent disregard
might in some sense cause the defendant’s failure to perform a
legal duty. And a state of, perhaps non-negligent, disregard also
might in some sense cause her failure to perform a legal duty.
In negligence and strict liability omission cases, we might say
that the mens rea causes, and becomes manifest in, the omission
by constituting, part or all of, the omission. To offer an example
for analogical purposes: A’s sister’s having a baby caused A to
become an aunt. The sister’s having a baby constitutes A’s
becoming an aunt—the cause and effect are not logically
independent. One might also, loosely, say that the sister’s
having a baby is manifested in A’s becoming an aunt.
But for the agent-causal retributivist, the mere
manifestation of mens rea in this causal-logical sense is not the
crucial justificatory point. For a retributivist, the crucial point
is always whether the defendant deserves punishment. Since
the defendant’s actual psychology and agent-causal control are
irrelevant in negligence and strict liability omission cases, it
would seem that for the agent-causal retributivist to justify the
VAR in such cases, she must explain how a defendant could
deserve punishment without relying on or referring to the
defendant’s actual psychological states or the degree of the
defendant’s agent-causal control.
An agent-causal retributivist could offer such an
explanation, however. A defendant could deserve punishment
for an omission if it seems justifiable for her to be subject to
punitive liability independently of whether she, as an agent,
tries, in the technical sense, to do, or to not-do, anything. Only
certain omissions are ever included in the actus reus of a crime.
208. Strict-Liability Crime, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 378 (7th ed. 1999).
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And those omissions are failures to perform legally imposed
duties. If in all cases in which the law imposes such duties it
seems plausible that failing in the duty would ground moral
responsibility and desert, then a retributivist, whether an agent
causalist or not, would be able to justify including some
omissions within the VAR. (Although the retributivist might
complain that it is misleading to include omissions within a
principle called the “Voluntary Act Requirement.” Maybe it
would be better to enact a separate “Limited Class of Omissions
Requirement” and then insist that the fundamental predicate of
criminal liability would be satisfying either the VAR or the
separate “omissions” requirement.)
In Manon, the defendant was the infant’s mother.209 She
had not given him up for adoption, and she had not given up her
parental rights.210 It may seem plausible that she deserves
punishment for neglecting her son even if she did not try to
neglect him. To offer another example, in Commonwealth v.
Levesque,211 the court reversed a dismissal of the defendants’
indictment for manslaughter. The defendants were alleged to
have (a) accidentally started a warehouse fire and (b) failed to
report the fire.212 Eventually, six fire fighters perished in the
blaze.213 The defendants’ indictment was dismissed because the
defendants successfully argued that they “had no legal duty to
report the fire and [that] their failure to act did not satisfy the
standard of wanton and reckless conduct required for
manslaughter charges.”214 The Levesque court reversed the
dismissal, however:
It is true that, in general, one does not have a duty
to take affirmative action[;] however, a duty to
prevent harm to others arises when one creates a
dangerous situation, whether that situation was
created intentionally or negligently.215
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/1

People v. Manon, 640 N.Y.S.2d 318, 319 (App. Div. 1996).
See generally id.
Commonwealth v. Levesque, 766 N.E.2d 50 (Mass. 2002).
Id. at 53.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 56.
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Where a defendant’s failure to exercise reasonable
care to prevent the risk he created is reckless and
results in death, the defendant can be convicted of
involuntary manslaughter. Public policy requires
that “one who creates, by his own conduct . . . a
grave risk of death or injury to others has a duty
and obligation to alleviate the danger.”216
It may seem plausible that the Levesque defendants deserve
punishment for not taking steps to prevent the risk that they
created even if they did not try not-to-prevent it. Generally, as
long as the legal duty imposed is similar to those imposed in
Manon and Levesque, the agent-causal retributivist can explain
how a defendant could, by omission, satisfy the VAR and deserve
punishment. And this could be done without relying on or
referring to the defendant’s actual psychological states217 or the
degree of the defendant’s agent-causal control.
C.

Habitual Action Cases

In the third type of case, there is criminal liability even
though the defendant acts out of habit. Habitual actions count
as voluntary acts for the purposes of the VAR. As MPC § 2.02(d)
clarifies, not counting as a voluntary act for the purposes of the
VAR is “a bodily movement that . . . is not a product of the effort
or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual.” This
suggests that a habitual bodily movement is a product of the
effort or determination of the actor and is therefore a voluntary
act.
Yaffe devises a hypothetical:

216. Id. at 57 (citations omitted).
217. In the case of a reckless omission some reference to the defendant’s
actual psychology would be necessary because “[a] person acts recklessly with
respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will
result from his conduct . . . .” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (Official Draft
and Explanatory Notes 1985) (emphasis added). But the crucial point remains
that the defendant’s agent-causal power would be irrelevant.
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Consider a defendant who has been trained by the
military to spin around and fire immediately, and
without thinking, on a threat behind him. This
behavior has become, thanks to his training,
habitual. Is he to be held guilty of a crime when,
at the local firing range, he spins and fires on a
person behind him who yells something
threatening? . . . The bodily movements in cases
such as this are routinely taken to provide an
acceptable basis for criminal liability.218
Yaffe points out that in such a case, a court would assume
that the defendant willed the habitual behavior, even if the court
was unsure whether the behavior was willed. As Yaffe explains:
Normally, our ignorance about a feature of
pertinence to criminal liability is enough to supply
reasonable doubt, and thus enough to support an
acquittal. But not in habitual action cases. If
there is reasonable doubt about whether the
defendant’s bodily movement was voluntary
deriving from the fact that it is habitual, that
reasonable doubt fails to undermine the case for
guilt. We treat habitual bodily movements . . . as
though they were voluntary acts in the legal
sense, even though we have no idea whether they
are in fact.219
Thus, habitual action cases depart from the fundamental
legal principle that requisites for criminal liability must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt before punishment is
imposed. Even if it seemed ludicrous to suggest that a defendant
acted voluntarily in any usual sense of the term voluntarily,
acting on the basis of habit would dispositively establish
voluntary action for legal purposes. And as Yaffe further
clarifies, courts will also consider the VAR satisfied in habitual
action cases without regard to whether the defendant was at
218. Yaffe, supra note 2, at 177.
219. Id.
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fault in being in a situation where his habit might be “triggered”
and cause harmful results:
The defendant in [the firing range] case . . . need
not be shown to have been at fault for being in the
circumstances in which he found himself, nor
would the behaviors that got him there need to be
shown to have been voluntary. The mere fact . . .
that the relevant bodily movements were the
product of habit is sufficient to show there to be
compliance with the VAR in assigning a guilty
verdict.220
To modify the firing range case to challenge the idea that
habit should always automatically establish voluntariness,
imagine that the conditioning that ingrained the soldier’s
shooting habit was intense and irresistible. We could imagine a
process similar to the conditioning not to commit harmful acts
imposed on Alex DeLarge in Stanley Kubrik’s movie, “A
Clockwork Orange.”221 The soldier volunteers to be subjected to
this “rewiring” to empower him to complete vital military
missions that save thousands of lives. Upon retirement from the
military, knowing of the potential danger his habit poses, he
never goes near firearms. He assiduously avoids any situation
in which his latent automatic response might be triggered.
One day, some evil masterminds decide to kill their nemesis,
Victor, in an elaborate way. So they drug and kidnap both Victor
and the habituated soldier, taking both to the local firing range.
They put a loaded gun in the soldier’s hand, and they place
Victor behind the soldier. Very close to Victor’s head, they
position a speaker ready to project a pre-recorded sound that the
masterminds know will trigger the soldier’s ingrained,
automatic habit. Immediately after the drugs wear off and both
kidnap victims fully come to, the masterminds play the
220. Id. at 183.
221. In this movie, Alex commits anti-social acts. He is caught and
eventually released back into society, but only after having undergone an
intense regimen of conditioning involving drugs and other invasive techniques,
which renders him violently ill whenever he tries to commit further anti-social
acts.
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recording remotely. The rest of the hypothetical is the same as
Yaffe’s. The soldier spins and fires, killing Victor. If the soldier
is tried for homicide, then the court will rule that the VAR is
satisfied. This is not to say that the soldier ultimately will be
found guilty. But if he is acquitted, it will not be because the
VAR was not satisfied.
How might an agent-causal retributivist justification of the
VAR handle such a case? The agent causalist faces a significant
difficulty here. The habit of the militarily-trained defendant
was apparently ingrained to the point where he lacked control
over spinning and firing. The most straightforward agent
causalist assessment would be that the VAR should not be
considered satisfied because the defendant did not cause his
conduct. Instead, his training took over and made him do what
did in an event-causal, deterministic manner. Essentially, the
masterminds used the soldier as a weapon. The soldier was no
more responsible, morally, than the gun was. He therefore
lacked desert:
Under one construal, habitual actions are simply
“triggered” by perception of the environment. It is
because he hears something threatening behind
him that the soldier . . . spins and fires. But given
that it is not in his control that he should hear the
threat, it is not under his control that he should
spin and fire on the person who issued it.222
It is tempting to argue that, at least usually, there is no
problem treating habitual actions as voluntary. For example,
imagine that Fred repeatedly drives his car quickly through a
fairly remote intersection to save time.223 He goes to work at
2:00 AM, and for years there has never been anyone else on the
road then. Fred’s habit regarding that intersection has become
virtually automatic. Then one night someone crosses that
intersection on foot a little after 2:00 AM. Fred notices her, but
only a couple of moments before getting to the intersection.

222. Yaffe, supra note 2, at 181.
223. This example is a modified version of an example in Yaffe, supra note
2, at 174.
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Usually, he would be able to stop in time, but Fred’s habit kicks
in, and the pedestrian is run over. If Fred is charged with a
crime, then presumably he will not be able successfully to defend
by arguing that the VAR was not satisfied. And even in an
extreme, contrived scenario such as the modified firing range
case, some other principle of criminal law would prevent the
soldier from being found guilty.224 From a pragmatic point of
view, it is acceptable to pretend that the soldier voluntarily spun
and fired at Victor as long as, in the end, the soldier is not found
guilty of a crime.
Insofar as we care about punishing persons only when it is
the right thing to do, this pragmatic argument does reasonably
well. By treating habitual actions as per se voluntary, we get
things right, vis-à-vis voluntariness, most of the time, and we
never punish someone who does not voluntarily act. So for
practical purposes, we can defend the law’s deviation from
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt of any factor
pertinent to criminal liability.
But this approach is second-best. When applying and
justifying a doctrine as fundamental as the VAR, it should
matter not just that we wind up getting the right answer as to
guilt or innocence. It should also matter that we get the right
answer for the right reason. At stake is justifying not just
coercive governmental intrusion into the lives of criminals that
causes them suffering. Punishment hurts criminals on purpose.
Ideally, we should have a good justificatory reason behind every
aspect of doing that. And treating the soldier as if he acted
voluntarily would be based on a falsehood.225
Consider Yaffe’s account of how the Manifestation of Mens
Rea Rationale handles habitual action cases in general:
224. Perhaps the soldier would not satisfy the requisite mens rea.
225. But consider: There is a significant cost savings in habitual action
cases if no proof is required that the habit involved leaves the defendant
sufficiently in control. Requiring proof of other elements of mens rea and actus
reus is already expensive, and those requirements afford the defendant
significant protection against wrongful conviction. (I wish to thank David A.
Simon for suggesting this in conversation.)
This might justify the law’s practice from an economic point of view. But such
a justification would compromise the main idea behind the VAR—assuring
control sufficient for criminal liability. We might ultimately need to decide
whether respecting the main idea behind the VAR in all cases is worth it. If it
is not, then the economic justification might just have to do.
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The rationale for treating convictions for habitual
actions as complying with the VAR is
. . . [that] some habitual actions can be
manifestations of objectionable mental states in
the sense that matters to morality, even if they
are not guided by one’s conscious volitions. One
benefit of a habit is that it produces conduct for
which there are reasons without the agent taking
the time to reflect on and weigh those reasons
. . . . However, a byproduct of this valuable feature
of habits is that they override our tendencies to
withhold action in the face of reasons to do so.226
Yaffe argues that habits often connect a mens rea with an
actus reus to establish criminal liability. Fred might be
considered reckless when he strikes the pedestrian with his car.
His habit of running through the intersection connects his
recklessness to the striking of the pedestrian such that Fred’s
recklessness becomes manifest in the striking. If the law did not
treat Fred’s habitual action as voluntary, then the VAR’s
function of assuring correspondence between mens rea and actus
reus would be undermined.
This argument works well in many cases, such as Fred’s.
When it is Fred’s recklessness that needs to get connected to the
consequences of his conduct, things seem to turn out right vis-àvis the VAR. But as Yaffe also points out, a court will treat a
defendant’s habitual action as voluntary without any regard to
whether the defendant is responsible for being in a situation in
which his habit might get triggered with disastrous results.
Fred was reckless. He consciously disregarded the risk posed by
heading toward the intersection, given is habit of going right
through it without stopping. Fred was at fault for putting
himself into a dangerous triggering situation. And this is why
the Manifestation of Mens Rea Rationale works so well in Fred’s
case.
But what about the modified firing range case? The soldier
was entirely free from fault for being in a situation in which his
226. Yaffe, supra note 2, at 188.
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habit was dangerously triggered. And the soldier had a good,
perhaps even heroic, reason to get habituated to turn and shoot
in the first place. Unlike Fred’s case, there is no recklessness to
get connected to the consequences of the soldier’s conduct to
assure that his conduct manifests recklessness. And it is
difficult to see what mens rea there may be other than
recklessness to connect to and thereby be made manifest in the
soldier’s conduct. There seems to be no point, in the modified
firing range case, to assuring the manifestation of mens rea to
justify imposing criminal liability upon the soldier.
And this problem carries over generally to cases where a
defendant is not morally blameworthy for being in a situation in
which his habit might threaten the interests that criminal law
is designed to protect. In sum, it seems that in cases such as the
modified firing range case it is not defensible to treat the
defendant as though he acted voluntarily. And the agent-causal
retributivist has a straightforward explanation for this. It is not
defensible because the VAR is supposed to assure that the
defendant has control, and in such cases the defendant lacks
control because he does not agent-cause his conduct.
VII. Conclusion
For retributive justifications of the VAR to be plausible,
agent causalism must be true. The ALI clarifies that the main
idea behind the VAR is to assure that a defendant controls any
conduct for which she is subject to criminal liability. For a
retributivist, control is important because without it, the
defendant cannot be morally responsible for her conduct and
therefore cannot deserve punishment. And for the defendant to
have the requisite control, she must agent-cause her conduct.
This result is significant because agent causalism is contentious.
If agent causalism is false, then retributivism—one of the two
major theories of punishment in the legal academic literature
and judicial opinions—cannot contribute to justifying the
fundamental predicate of criminal responsibility.
The significance of this result is enhanced when one
considers that agent causalism is not incoherent and is at least
plausible. It should be taken seriously as a possible solution to
the problem of free will. Additionally, if agent causalism is true,
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then the retributivist can account not only for why the VAR is
justified in paradigmatic cases of criminal conduct. The agentcausal retributivist can handle unusual cases too—including
cases featuring complex unconscious behavior and crimes of
omission.
Finally, the agent-causal retributivist can
accommodate most cases in which criminal conduct is caused
directly by habit.
It is consistent with agent-causal
retributivism to rely on the Manifestation of Mens Rea Rationale
for those cases, since punitive desert requires correspondence
between mens rea and actus reus. And in cases such as the
modified firing range case, the agent-causal retributivist can
explain why the law is not justified in failing to require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of a factor necessary for criminal
liability. At least in such cases, the law should not continue to
assume that a defendant’s bodily movement is voluntary simply
because it is habitual.
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